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Article 
Restoring Reason to the Third Party 
Doctrine 
Lucas Issacharoff† & Kyle Wirshba†† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Since 1967, the Supreme Court has defined the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment as extending only to information in 
which one has “[a] reasonable expectation of privacy.”1 A key 
application of that principle is the third party doctrine, which 
allows the government to collect any information a criminal 
suspect has entrusted to a third party without falling afoul of 
the Fourth Amendment.2 The basis for the rule is simple: once 
information is relinquished to another, its original owner loses 
any expectation of privacy he or she may once have had in the 
information.3  
The third party doctrine has the virtue of simplicity and 
administrability. It also once had the great virtue of corre-
sponding to the core intuitions of the citizenry in terms of ex-
pectations of privacy and confidentiality.4 Unfortunately, the 
third party doctrine turned heavily on the limited forms of in-
 
†  Law Clerk, Hon. Reena Raggi, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit. 
†† Law Clerk, Hon. Ronnie Abrams, United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York. We would like to thank Professors Jack Gold-
smith, Samuel Issacharoff, Orin Kerr, and Carol Steiker for their invaluable 
feedback. Copyright © 2016 by Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba.  
 1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). 
 2. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 561, 563 (2009) (defining the third party doctrine).  
 3. Id.  
 4. But cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749–50 (1979) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the third party doctrine, even at its inception, never 
corresponded to a realistic account of individuals’ expectations of privacy); 
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 342–44 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that taxpayers are forced by the tax code’s complexity to use account-
ants as intermediaries, and that people have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the information they share with an accountant). 
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teraction in a prior technological era. As society has changed, 
the presumption of limited means of dissemination of infor-
mation has all but collapsed, and the scope of what is covered 
by the third party doctrine has thus expanded. Communica-
tions, commerce, and finance increasingly take place online and 
operate through private intermediaries; accordingly, the third 
party doctrine has left an immense amount of personal infor-
mation unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. The impact of 
these technological developments on police surveillance is most 
hotly debated today in the field of data mining,5 but the third 
party doctrine is implicated at every level of law enforcement, 
from cops on the beat to the National Security Agency. 
Perhaps bowing to the inevitable, in 2012 five justices of 
the Court in United States v. Jones6 suggested that the third 
party doctrine could no longer be maintained in its current, ab-
solute form, although the same five justices were unable to of-
fer a controlling alternative. The necessity of doctrinal overhaul 
was further reinforced by the Court’s recent decision in Riley v. 
California.7 In evaluating the search of a cell phone incident to 
a suspect’s arrest, the Court unanimously found that rapid 
technological change and societal expectations had rendered 
impracticable the simple application of a pre-digital Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. These acknowledgments of doctrinal 
desuetude have only increased the tempo of suggested alterna-
tives. Proposals for doctrinal tweaks of the doctrine are virtual-
ly a cottage industry today, but the various critiques are for the 
most part chasing a moving target of evolving technology. In-
stead, reform must engage the twin aims of the doctrine in 
terms of protecting citizen expectations of privacy and provid-
ing rational tools for law enforcement. 
This Article takes up the challenge left open by the incom-
plete resolution in Jones. Attempting to fill this doctrinal void, 
we look not to further tweaks from within the third party doc-
trine but instead to the Court’s development of the exceptions 
to the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause. Following this 
doctrinal foundation, we believe that courts can determine the 
 
 5. See, e.g., Joseph T. Thai, Is Data Mining Ever a Search Under Justice 
Stevens’s Fourth Amendment?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1735 (2006) (argu-
ing data mining and the third party doctrine adversely affect the protections 
provided by the Fourth Amendment); Note, Data Mining, Dog Sniffs, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 691, 693–701 (2014) (analyzing how 
data mining is regulated by the Fourth Amendment, how it is outside the 
scope of a search, and providing available alternatives). 
 6. 132 S. Ct. 945, 957–60 (2012). 
 7. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493–95 (2014). 
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reasonableness of third party searches through a uniform 
standard that both protects legitimate expectations of privacy 
in the citizenry and at the same time is easily administrable by 
law enforcement. We argue that this standard offers a worka-
ble middle ground between the current absence of constitution-
al protection of information in the hands of third parties and 
the overburdening of law enforcement that the imposition of 
warrant and probable cause requirements would entail. 
In Part I we discuss the third party doctrine, examining its 
roots and its current state of flux following Jones, as well as the 
critiques leveled against it. In Part II we evaluate the potential 
judge-made replacements put forward by courts and scholars, 
concluding that they cannot offer a satisfactory solution. In 
Part III we offer a new doctrinal approach. Looking to other 
cases in which searches are deemed to fall outside the Warrant 
Clause, we argue that third party searches are better charac-
terized as a new type of warrant exception than as either a 
search subject to the warrant and probable cause requirements 
or a nonsearch unregulated by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, 
our proposal shifts the focus of analysis from whether or not 
examination of information in the hands of third parties should 
be considered a search to when such a search is reasonable. In 
Part IV we examine Terry v. Ohio8 as a model for how courts 
could apply such a reasonableness inquiry while avoiding the 
pitfalls of freeform judicial balancing. Instead of weighing the 
interests at stake in each case, courts should weigh the inter-
ests at stake in third party searches as a general matter, and 
then craft a reasonable suspicion standard that can be applied 
on a uniform basis. Finally, in Part V we assess the limitations 
and potential applications of this new test for third party 
searches. 
I.  THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE   
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE 
As with much of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
starting point for the third party doctrine is Katz v. United 
States9 and its “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.10 In that 
case, the government’s interception of Katz’s call from a public 
phone booth was deemed a search because Katz, despite being 
outside his home, had a reasonable expectation that his call 
 
 8. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 9. 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 10. Id. at 360. 
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would remain private.11 Katz overturned a prior decision refus-
ing to find a Fourth Amendment search in similar circumstanc-
es;12 the earlier decision had rested upon the fact that the police 
had eavesdropped upon the defendant’s phone call from the 
street and thus did not enter any constitutionally protected 
space.13 The Katz Court declared that “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places,” and renounced the theory that 
Fourth Amendment interests must be tied to property.14 The 
Supreme Court would later adopt a two-part framework for the 
Katz test,15 first asking whether an individual had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the information, and then whether 
that expectation is one that “society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.”16  
Following Katz, the Court was faced with the task of squar-
ing the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test with cases allow-
ing the use of undercover agents or informants in whom sus-
pects had placed their trust.17 In those prior cases, the Court 
had held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect “a 
wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he volun-
tarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”18 In 1971, the 
Supreme Court found that the earlier cases survived the Katz 
test.19 It held that “however strongly a defendant may trust an 
apparent colleague, his expectations in this respect are not pro-
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 352–53 (majority opinion). 
 13. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (stating that “the 
sense of hearing” does not constitute a search or a seizure). 
 14. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. As the majority held in Jones, the Katz test 
supplemented rather than supplanted the physical trespass doctrine of 
Olmstead. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950–54 (2012); 
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. 
 15. The test is based on Justice Harlan’s Katz concurrence, which was ap-
plied by the Supreme Court thereafter. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 (“Our later 
cases have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in [Katz], 
which said that a violation occurs when government officers violate a person’s 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’”). 
 16. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (quoting Katz, 389 
U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 17. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211–12 (1966) (admit-
ting evidence of undercover officer despite entry into defendant’s home); Hoffa 
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966) (admitting evidence of confidential 
informant); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963) (admitting evi-
dence of bribe of undercover agent wearing a wire); Lee v. United States, 343 
U.S. 747, 757–58 (1952) (admitting evidence of undercover informant wearing 
a wire).  
 18. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302. 
 19. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 568–69. 
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tected by the Fourth Amendment when it turns out that the 
colleague is a government agent.”20 
Systematizing this principle, the Court articulated the 
third party doctrine in a series of cases throughout the 1970s. 
First, in Couch v. United States21 and United States v. Miller,22 
the Court found that the defendants had no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in records given to an accountant in Couch23 
and a bank in Miller.24 Relying in part on the undercover cases, 
the Court reasoned that any person “takes the risk, in reveal-
ing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed 
by that person to the Government.”25 Therefore, the Court ex-
plained,  
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government author-
ities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will 
be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the 
third party will not be betrayed.26 
Then, in 1979, the Court expanded the third party doctrine 
in Smith v. Maryland.27 Moving beyond business records, Smith 
approved the admission at trial of data from a pen register—or 
a device that keeps track of dialed numbers—obtained without 
a warrant.28 Investigating threatening and obscene phone calls 
following a robbery, law enforcement officers asked the phone 
company to install a pen register to record the phone numbers 
dialed by their primary suspect, Smith.29 When the pen register 
confirmed that Smith had been calling the victim, police used 
the information to obtain a search warrant for Smith’s home 
and thereafter secure an indictment and conviction.30 Though 
the police had no warrant for the pen register, the Court denied 
Smith’s argument that the pen register should have been sup-
pressed. It held, consistent with Couch and Miller, that because 
Smith “voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the tele-
 
 20. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971). Although White 
rested on only a plurality, Justice Black’s concurrence was quite broad, signal-
ing the holding rested with Justice White’s plurality opinion. See Kerr, supra 
note 2, at 568 n.38. 
 21. 409 U.S. 322 (1973). 
 22. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 23. Couch, 409 U.S. at 335–36.  
 24. Miller, 425 U.S. at 445–46. 
 25. Id. at 443 (citing White, 401 U.S. at 751–52). 
 26. Id. 
 27. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 28. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 570. 
 29. Smith, 442 U.S. at 747. 
 30. Id. 
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phone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment 
in the ordinary course of business,” he could “claim no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy.”31 Further, whether or not the 
phone company independently chose to keep track of these 
phone records was of no moment; “that [the phone company] 
had facilities for recording and that it was free to record” was 
sufficient.32 
Thereafter, the Supreme Court33 and circuit courts34 duti-
fully reaffirmed the third party doctrine until the D.C. Circuit’s 
and the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Jones.35 
Jones, discussed more fully below, turned on whether extended 
Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring violated the 
Fourth Amendment. While the case itself did not directly impli-
cate the third party doctrine, five justices in concurring opin-
ions indicated a willingness to rethink parts of the doctrine.36 
Justice Sotomayor went so far in her concurring opinion as to 
note that, given advances in technology, “it may be necessary to 
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties.”37 She reasoned that the third party doctrine  
is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carry-
ing out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they 
dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and 
the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet 
service providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they pur-
chase to online retailers.38 
Following Justice Sotomayor’s dicta, the solid edifice of the 
third party doctrine has begun to erode. While some courts con-
 
 31. Id. at 744. 
 32. Id. at 745. 
 33. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (relying on 
Smith in finding no expectation of privacy in garbage left on curtilage); United 
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736–37 (1980) (refusing to suppress evidence 
stolen from the defendant’s banker on third party doctrine grounds). 
 34. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 330–31 (6th Cir. 
2010) (finding that e-mail metadata—primarily to/from addresses—fall within 
the third party doctrine); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (refusing to suppress website visitation information acquired by 
computer surveillance).  
 35. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part 
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 36. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 37. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). 
 38. Id. 
2016] RESTORING REASON 993 
 
tinue to adhere to the doctrine’s strictures,39 other judges have 
seized on the Jones concurrences and found a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in telephonic metadata and cell-site data.40 
Two terms ago, the Court dealt another indirect blow to the 
third party doctrine. In Riley v. California,41 the Court refused 
to extend the traditional Fourth Amendment exception for 
searches incident to arrest to searches of an arrestee’s cell-
phone. Decades earlier, in United States v. Robinson,42 the 
Court had upheld the “unqualified authority of the arresting 
officer to search the arrestee’s person” and accompanying ef-
fects.43 The Government argued that searches of cellphones 
were “materially indistinguishable” from the searches of wal-
lets, purses, and other effects that had been upheld under Rob-
inson,44 and the Riley Court acknowledged that a “mechanical 
application of Robinson might well support the warrantless 
searches at issue here.”45 Yet the Court found that mechanically 
equating wallets and cellphones would be “like saying a ride on 
horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the 
moon . . . . Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy 
concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a ciga-
 
 39. See, e.g., In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 
(5th Cir. 2013) (allowing the collection of cell site data under the third party 
doctrine); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (permit-
ting the mass collection of telephonic metadata), vacated, 785 F.3d 810, 824–
25 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing Jones and noting the “seriousness of the constitu-
tional concerns” implicated by the National Security Agency’s mass collection 
of metadata). 
 40. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344–61 (4th Cir. 
2015) (finding the third party doctrine inapplicable based in part on the Jones 
concurrences), reh’g en banc granted, Nos. 12-4659(L), 12-4825, 2015 WL 
6531272 (Oct. 28, 2015); United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1215 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (endorsing the Jones mosaic theory but finding it “not necessary to 
establish the invasion of privacy in the case of cell site location data”), rev’d en 
banc, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. May 5, 2015) (“[L]ike the bank customer 
in Miller and the phone customer in Smith, Davis has no subjective or objec-
tive reasonable expectation of privacy in MetroPCS’s business records showing 
the cell tower locations that wirelessly connected his calls at or near the time 
of six of the seven robberies. . . . We find no reason to conclude that cell phone 
users lack facts about the functions of cell towers or about telephone providers’ 
recording cell tower usage.”); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 33 
(D.D.C. 2013), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 41. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014). 
 42. 414 U.S. 218, 229, 235 (1973). 
 43. Id. at 229. 
 44. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488. 
 45. Id. at 2484. 
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rette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”46 The Court went on to con-
clude that 
[m]odern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. 
With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many 
Americans “the privacies of life.” The fact that technology now allows 
an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the 
information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders 
fought.47 
More directly relevant to the third party doctrine, the 
Court noted that evolving technology might render other digi-
tal-analog comparisons inapplicable: “Is an e-mail equivalent to 
a letter? Is a voicemail equivalent to a phone message slip?”48 
The assumption of technological neutrality between such ana-
log and digital communications has been critical to defenses of 
the third party doctrine,49 and the Court’s apparent rejection of 
this assumption undermines the doctrine’s foundation. 
Today the third party doctrine remains an important part 
of Fourth Amendment law, but has been called into serious 
question by cases that did not directly resolve questions over its 
vitality and extent. It is worth considering, therefore, whether 
the third party doctrine deserves to survive, and if so in what 
form. 
B. EVALUATING THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE 
Academics and the lower courts have long been sharply 
critical of the third party doctrine, though notably almost in-
variably on the expectation of privacy side of the divide, with 
correspondingly little attention to the legitimacy of law en-
forcement objectives.50 Following Katz’s formulation, scholars 
have launched a two-fold critique of the third party doctrine: 
first, that people’s subjective expectations of privacy do not ac-
cord with the third party doctrine, and second, that society 
should not discount these expectations as unreasonable. 
Technological change, many argue, has shifted people’s 
subjective expectations of privacy. At one time, the argument 
 
 46. Id. at 2488–89. 
 47. Id. at 2494–95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 
(1886)). 
 48. Id. at 2493. 
 49. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 2, at 579–81 (discussing the drawbacks of 
the analog test). 
 50. Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 581, 585 (2011) (“While Smith and the Third Party Doctrine were heavily 
criticized even before the Internet age, the drumbeat of criticism has intensi-
fied . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
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often goes, a person’s decision to provide information to third 
parties may have evinced a lack of expectation of privacy, but 
current expectations are different. In modern digital society, 
individuals routinely use the Internet to communicate and to 
store information that they would regard as quite private.51 For 
example, the growth of “cloud storage” subjects significantly 
more private data to the third party exception.52 Whereas data 
may once have stayed tucked away on a computer as it could in 
a file cabinet, once stored on the cloud it would be subject to 
law enforcement’s prying eyes.53 Putting this intuition to the 
test, one study has exposed the increasing disconnect between 
actual and doctrinal expectations of privacy: people surveyed 
reported that they regard many types of information falling 
squarely within the third party doctrine (and thus unprotected 
by the Fourth Amendment) as significantly more private than 
other types that are protected by the Fourth Amendment, thus 
requiring law enforcement to demonstrate reasonable suspicion 
or even probable cause.54  
Critics further argue that the basic conception of privacy 
inherent in the third party doctrine is outmoded. The doctrine 
defines privacy as an on/off trigger—nondisclosure keeps in-
formation private, while any disclosure completely waives one’s 
privacy interest. The doctrine refuses to recognize the real pos-
sibility that individuals could disclose information to third par-
ties for limited purposes. But there is no reason to “treat[] ex-
posure to a limited audience as morally equivalent to exposure 
 
 51. See generally Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Elec-
tronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1571 (2004) (questioning 
whether privacy standards set by the ECPA provide adequate protection). 
 52. Cloud storage is the warehousing of digital information on a shared 
server owned by a third party instead of on local hard drives. See Aaron J. 
Gold, Obscured by Clouds: The Fourth Amendment and Searching Cloud Stor-
age Accounts Through Locally Installed Software, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2321, 2323 (2015) (“[C]loud storage is a term for storing data and files on re-
mote drives.”). 
 53. See William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing 
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1223 (2010) 
(arguing that free cloud services are not protected); see also David A. 
Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles 
to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 
2219–20 (2009) (“[I]s it not reasonable to consider a digital account containing 
the same types of materials [as a briefcase], stored in the cloud rather than on 
a computer hard drive, as serving that purpose as well?”). 
 54. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERN-
MENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 184, 186 (2007) (finding 
that government examination of email metadata is regarded as more invasive 
than pat downs and vehicle searches).  
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to the whole world.”55 In fact, a more nuanced conception of pri-
vacy might be desirable, as it could encourage the sharing of 
sensitive information56 and prevent the creation of “Information 
Age hermits” unwilling to meaningfully participate in digital 
society.57 
Technology has also altered whether such subjective expec-
tations should be regarded as objectively reasonable. Not only 
do people expect privacy on the Internet, critics of the third 
party doctrine argue, but they also should be entitled to that 
expectation of privacy. Transacting in sensitive information 
through the Internet is, in many ways, no longer a choice. Jus-
tice Marshall expressed such concerns in his dissent in Smith: 
Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion of 
choice. . . . [H]ere, unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for 
many has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help 
but accept the risk of surveillance. It is idle to speak of “assuming” 
risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no re-
alistic alternative.58 
Justice Marshall’s critique has even more force today, 
when eighty percent of Americans now rely on the Internet dai-
ly.59 As more vital services move online, it will become increas-
ingly difficult to apply for jobs,60 access government services,61 
or even communicate without using the Internet.62 Many have 
 
 55. Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth 
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 
(2002) (“[T]reating exposure to a limited audience as identical to exposure to 
the world[] means failing to recognize degrees of privacy in the Fourth 
Amendment context.”). 
 56. See id. at 123 (“[O]ne might choose to forfeit some of her freedom from 
exposure without thereby forfeiting all of it.”). 
 57. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY 
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 217 (2004) (arguing that maintaining the third par-
ty doctrine mantra “if people want to protect privacy, they should not share 
their information with third parties,” will create “Information Age hermits”).  
 58. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749–50 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). 
 59. Tokson, supra note 50, at 588. 
 60. See Anushka Asthana & Tracy McVeigh, Government Services To Be 
Online-Only, OBSERVER (Nov. 20, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/ 
2010/nov/20/government-services-online-only. 
 61. See DARRELL M. WEST, BROOKINGS, STATE AND FEDERAL ELECTRONIC 
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 2–3 (2008), http://www.brookings 
.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/8/26%20egovernment%20west/0826_ 
egovernment_west.pdf (explaining how government services are increasingly 
being moved online). 
 62. Leslie Meredith, U.S. Considers “Internet Access for All,” 
TECHNEWSDAILY (Jan. 28, 2010, 9:45 AM), http://www.livescience.com/8062 
-considers-internet-access.html (reporting on the increasing role governments 
are taking in making sure their citizens have access to the internet, and how 
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argued that routing private information through the Internet is 
now simply inevitable.63 Given this inevitability, Professor 
Richard A. Epstein contends that use of third party intermedi-
aries cannot be regarded as consent to government surveil-
lance, or even as a legitimate assumption of the risk of surveil-
lance.64 
From a functional perspective,65 some maintain that the 
third party doctrine exposes individuals to too much govern-
ment snooping.66 Because “it is not far-fetched for government 
officials to amass data for use in silencing or attacking enemies, 
critics, undesirables, or radicals,”67 the third party doctrine 
prevents the courts from using the Fourth Amendment as a 
tool to limit government misbehavior.68 Such concerns have not 
only led eleven state supreme courts to interpret their constitu-
 
that affects communication). 
 63. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 57 (“[P]eople . . . have little choice but to 
hand over information to third parties. Life in the Information Age depends 
upon sharing information with a host of third party companies.”). In this vein, 
some scholars have argued that internet access is a human right. See Young 
Joon Lim & Sarah E. Sexton, Internet as a Human Right: A Practical Legal 
Framework To Address the Unique Nature of the Medium and To Promote De-
velopment, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 295, 315 (2012) (exploring the protec-
tion of the internet as a human right). Thus far France, Estonia, Finland, 
Greece, Spain, and the United Nations Human Rights Council have declared 
internet access to be a human right. See Brandon Wiebe, BART’s Unconstitu-
tional Speech Restriction: Adapting Free Speech Principles to Absolute Wireless 
Censorship, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 195, 219 (2012) (discussing the restriction of the 
Internet during times of crisis).  
 64. Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the 
Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199, 1205 
(2009) (“[S]uppose the government gave notice to the world that it would en-
gage in surveillance of all private activities at will; so draw your curtains, but 
the government can still peek through. People would have to alter their con-
duct in order not to assume the risk. No one would accept such unilateral leg-
islative declaration as sufficient to undermine constitutional rights that are 
intended to limit the scope of permissible government action.”).  
 65. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 572–73 (describing what Professor Kerr 
calls “the functional critique” of the third party doctrine). 
 66. Thai, supra note 5 (“[T]he Court has handed the government a blank 
check to conduct mass surveillance through data mining third-party records 
for suspicious persons and activities.”). 
 67. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth 
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1112 (2002) (cataloguing in-
stances of government misuse of personal data). 
 68. See generally Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for 
Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1272 (1983) (“[The Fourth 
Amendment] has been restricted so much that it fails to offer innocent citizens 
the protection to which they should be entitled under the fourth amend-
ment.”). 
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tions to avoid the doctrine,69 but have also led Congress to re-
sist the broad exposure, passing the Right to Financial Privacy 
Act in response to Miller and the Pen Register Act in response 
to Smith.70 
C. WHY A JUDICIAL SOLUTION? 
 The legislative responses to the privacy concerns engen-
dered by the third party doctrine—including the Right to Fi-
nancial Privacy Act, the Pen Register Act, the Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act of 1986,71 and the recently passed USA 
FREEDOM Act of 201572—raise the possibility that the third 
party doctrine should simply be left alone. To the extent it is 
flawed, legislatures, rather than courts, may be the proper 
agents to calibrate law enforcement needs with privacy con-
cerns. The two main arguments for this position are that legis-
lative solutions possess flexibility unavailable to constitutional 
law, and that the tradeoff between security and privacy is ap-
propriately within the realm of democratic accountability. 
Professor Orin Kerr has argued that such legislative “in-
termediate standards deter wrongful abuse while permitting 
legitimate investigations. They strike a middle ground not pos-
sible under the Fourth Amendment.”73 Yet as Kerr himself has 
acknowledged, this argument “assumes the standard all-or-
nothing options of Fourth Amendment law,”74 where an investi-
gative technique is either a search, requiring a warrant sup-
ported by probable cause, or not a search, in which case no pro-
tections apply. Adding an intermediate category—particularly, 
as proposed here, one that incorporates a reasonableness 
standard—significantly diminishes the inflexibility objection.  
 
 69. See Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How To 
Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs To Protect Third Party 
Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 376 (2006) 
(documenting state court decisions on adoption of the third party doctrine). 
 70. See Elspeth A. Brotherton, Big Brother Gets a Makeover: Behavioral 
Targeting and the Third-Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 576 (2012) (citing 
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XI, 92 Stat. 
3697 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–22 (2012)); Pen Register Act, 
Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. III, 100 Stat. 1868 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2012))). 
 71. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 72. Pub. L. No. 114-23, tit. L, 129 Stat. 268.  
 73. Kerr, supra note 2, at 597. 
 74. Orin S. Kerr, Defending the Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Ep-
stein and Murphy, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1229, 1232 (2009). 
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The second objection is standard to any proposal to raise 
the floor of constitutional protections: why not allow society, 
through democratic mechanisms, to set its own tradeoffs? And 
relatedly, why not allow states to experiment with different 
heightened protections, as many are already doing?75 There are 
three reasons why the protection of one or more legislatures is 
insufficient. First, and most basically, rights are “rights” be-
cause their enforcement does not depend on the acquiescence of 
others: “[F]undamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; 
they depend on the outcome of no elections.”76 The Supreme 
Court has recently reaffirmed this principle in response to a 
suggestion that privacy concerns with regard to evolving tech-
nology are best left to administrative protocols: “Probably a 
good idea, but the Founders did not fight a revolution to gain 
the right to government agency protocols.”77 
Second, democratic mechanisms may be particularly sus-
pect when it comes to regulating police practices. Majorities 
will often perceive, correctly, that the brunt of the costs of in-
trusive police practices are borne by others: “The core justifica-
tion for legal enforcement of rights is the risk that a majority 
will not bear the burdens of its laws but instead will abridge 
the liberties of a powerless or despised minority.”78 Professors 
Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan have noted the example 
of sex offender registration,79 while others have linked the rise 
of modern constitutional criminal procedure to the need to curb 
majority abuse of minority populations in the Jim Crow 
South.80 While rising minority political participation somewhat 
ameliorates such concerns, post-September 11th police practic-
es and the targeting of certain groups suggests the continued 
need for judicial enforcement of rights.81 
 
 75. See Henderson, supra note 69. 
 76. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015) (quoting W. Va. 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). 
 77. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014). 
 78. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Proce-
dural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 
209. 
 79. Id. (“A requirement that sex offenders register with local authorities 
after being released from prison is a notable example.”). 
 80. See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
1699, 1729 (2005) (“[T]he Court’s initial forays into state criminal procedure 
are best understood as responses to . . . cases in which Black defendants were 
sentenced to death with barely the façade of trial.”). 
 81. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUPPLE-
MENTAL REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES’ ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT 
THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, (Dec. 
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Finally, the federalism-based democratic response is unsat-
isfying where the collection and analysis of third party infor-
mation will often cross state lines. Citizens of one state may be 
relieved to know that the legislature of their state has protect-
ed them from overbroad collection of information by state au-
thorities, or prosecution by those authorities based on such col-
lection, but where fifty other sovereigns collect information 
across state lines the protections of a single state may be 
somewhat ephemeral.82 
It is not our intent to rehash the shortcomings of the third 
party doctrine, which have been thoroughly dissected in the ac-
ademic literature.83 We largely agree with those critiques, but 
express some doubt as to whether courts and scholars have 
identified a viable alternative. In the next Part we examine the 
success of those critiques in identifying a promising alternative 
to the third party doctrine, and subsequently we offer and 
evaluate our own (hopefully superior) alternative. 
II.  SURVEYING THE ALTERNATIVES TO THE THIRD 
PARTY DOCTRINE   
Despite the near-consensus that technological development 
has altered the expectations of privacy around third party in-
formation, both courts and the academy have struggled to de-
velop a workable scheme for determining which third party in-
formation the Fourth Amendment should protect, and what 
should remain available to police investigations without judi-
 
2003) (describing post-9/11 abuses against Muslims in Brooklyn federal pris-
on); see also Turkmen v. Hasty, No 13-981, 2015 WL 3756331, at *38 (2d Cir. 
June 17, 2015) (reinstating Bivens claims against high-level executive officials 
after 9/11).  
 82. See generally Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Data-
bases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1403 
(2001) (documenting state and federal collection of data). 
 83. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 54; SOLOVE, supra note 57; Epstein, 
supra note 64; Jessica K. Fink, Protected by Association? The Supreme Court’s 
Incomplete Approach To Defining the Scope of the Third-Party Retaliation Doc-
trine, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 521, 534 (2012); Tokson, supra note 50, at 588; Aubrey 
H. Brown III, Note, Georgia v. Randolph, The Red-Headed Stepchild of an Ug-
ly Family: Why Third-Party Consent Search Doctrine Is an Unfortunate Fourth 
Amendment Development that Should Be Restrained, 18 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 471, 473 (2009); Colleen Maher Ernst, Note, Looking Back To Look 
Forward: Reexamining the Application of the Third-Party Doctrine to Conveyed 
Papers, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 329, 336 (2014); Matthew D. Lawless, 
Note, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records and the Case 
for a “Crazy Quilt” of Fourth Amendment Protection, UCLA J.L. & TECH., Fall 
2007, at 1, 33–35; Loewy, supra note 68, at 1234. See generally Kerr, supra 
note 2, at 570–73 (collecting scholarship). 
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cial oversight. Competing and complementary theories have 
been advanced from across the ideological spectrum. These the-
ories can be separated into three groups: the mosaic theory 
originating in the courts; categorization approaches crafted by 
different scholars; and case-by-case balancing pushed by more 
textualist thinkers. 
A. MOSAIC THEORY 
The first approach, “mosaic theory,” was developed by the 
D.C. Circuit in United States v. Maynard,84 and has since been 
carried forward by other judges85 and academics.86 Most signifi-
cantly, five Supreme Court justices signaled agreement with 
the underlying principles of the mosaic theory in the course of 
affirming Maynard in United States v. Jones.87 
The D.C. Circuit in Maynard reversed Antoine Jones’s con-
viction because it found that the government’s extended sur-
veillance using GPS data had violated the Fourth Amend-
ment.88 During their investigation, police tracked Jones’s 
movements using a GPS device planted on a car for twenty-
eight days.89 In finding that a search occurred, Judge Ginsburg 
compared the aggregation of data to the creation of a mosaic in 
which the whole reveals more than the sum of its parts.90 In 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases, the government has 
 
 84. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 85. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 
1126–27 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[C]ourts 
have gradually but deliberately reduced the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment to the point at which it scarcely resembles the robust guarantor 
of our constitutional rights we knew when I joined the bench.”); In re Applica-
tion of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified 
Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 543 (D. Md. 2011); In re U.S. for Historical 
Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2010), vacated, 724 F.3d 
600 (5th Cir. 2013); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Release 
of Historical Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 86. See, e.g., David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking 
Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 411 (2013); Benjamin M. Ostrander, The 
“Mosaic Theory” and Fourth Amendment Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1733, 
1765 (2011). But see Courtney E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the Loss 
of Something a Lot Like Privacy: An Examination of the “Mosaic Theory” and 
the Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 169, 233 (2012) 
(concluding that the mosaic theory is unworkable). 
 87. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 88. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 549. 
 89. Id. at 558. 
 90. Id. at 561. 
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made use of the mosaic theory, warning that “[d]isparate items 
of information, though individually of limited or no utility to 
their possessor, can take on added significance when combined 
with other items of information.”91 Analogizing to this oft-taken 
FOIA position,92 the Maynard court found that “[w]hat may 
seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to 
one who has a broad view of the scene.”93 To a greater extent 
than when the key Fourth Amendment precedents had been 
decided, knowledge of “all of another’s travels can deduce 
whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, . . . an un-
faithful husband, . . . an associate of particular individuals or 
political groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but 
all such facts.”94 
On appeal, though the Supreme Court ultimately decided 
the case on a “narrower basis,”95 two Justices penned concur-
rences indicating approval of the application of the mosaic the-
ory to the Fourth Amendment. Justice Alito, speaking for four 
justices, and Justice Sotomayor, writing for herself, believed 
“longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
impinges on expectations of privacy.”96 As noted in Part I, other 
judges have since followed the lead of Justices Alito and 
Sotomayor, applying the mosaic theory to find the third party 
doctrine inapplicable and upholding an expectation of privacy 
even in situations where information was somehow no longer 
privately held.97  
 
 91. Bethany L. Dickman, Note, Untying Knotts: The Application of Mosaic 
Theory to GPS Surveillance in United States v. Maynard, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 
731, 736 (2011) (quoting David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Securi-
ty, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630 (2005)). 
 92. See Anna-Karina Parker, Dragnet Law Enforcement: Prolonged Sur-
veillance & the Fourth Amendment, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 23, 32 n.20 (2011); 
Julian Sanchez, GPS Tracking and a “Mosaic Theory” of Government Search-
es, CATO INST. (Aug. 11, 2010, 9:22 PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/gps 
-tracking-mosaic-theory-government-searches (“The theory holds that pieces of 
information that are not in themselves sensitive . . . can nevertheless be with-
held, because in combination . . . [they] permit the inference of facts that are 
sensitive . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).  
 93. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561 (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 
(1985)). 
 94. Id. at 562. 
 95. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., con-
curring). Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia relied upon the physical tres-
pass of the tracking device onto Jones’s car, arguing that the trespassory theo-
ry of the Fourth Amendment had survived the decision in Katz. Id. at 949–51 
(majority opinion). 
 96. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 964 (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment)). 
 97. See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 36 (D.D.C. 2013) (cit-
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While the mosaic theory has intuitive appeal—that the ac-
cumulation of vast amounts of information can pose a threat to 
privacy greater than the sum of its parts—it works better as a 
metaphor than as a constitutional doctrine. Despite the evoca-
tive imagery, the mosaic theory faces a significant hurdle due 
to its impracticality as an administrable standard for both law 
enforcement and courts. At what point does any unit of infor-
mation interact with other data to form the recognizable mosa-
ic? The mosaic theory complicates “all of the problems of line 
drawing which must be faced in any conscientious effort to ap-
ply the Fourth Amendment.”98  
The most obvious problem with such an approach is deter-
mining what amount of information constitutes a mosaic as op-
posed to a scattered collection of tiles.99 Justice Alito recognized 
this pitfall when he noted that the Court “need not identify 
with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle 
became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-
week mark.”100 Line drawing problems are presented, however, 
not only in the duration and scope of investigation, but also in 
determining which investigative techniques add to the mosaic 
and how investigations should be grouped across officers, de-
partments, or sovereigns.101 While many have taken up the 
mantle of the mosaic theory,102 no one has advanced satisfying 
answers to these difficult line-drawing questions.103  
 
ing Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562–63) (“Records that once would have revealed a 
few scattered tiles of information about a person now reveal an entire mosa-
ic—a vibrant and constantly updating picture of the person’s life.”), vacated, 
800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But see ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 
752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (reaching the opposite conclusion on nearly identical 
facts), vacated, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 98. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 147 (1978). 
 99. See Walsh, supra note 86, at 236–37. 
 100. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 101. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. 
L. REV. 311, 333–36 (2012). 
 102. See, e.g., Dickman, supra note 91; Parker, supra note 92, at 32; Priscil-
la J. Smith et al., When Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless Use of GPS 
Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment Right Against Unrea-
sonable Searches, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 177, 201 (2011); Erin Smith Dennis, 
Note, A Mosaic Shield: Maynard, the Fourth Amendment, and Privacy Rights 
in the Digital Age, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 737, 770–71 (2011); Justin P. Webb, 
Note, Car-ving Out Notions of Privacy: The Impact of GPS Tracking and Why 
Maynard Is a Move in the Right Direction, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 788–96 
(2012). 
 103. Kerr, supra note 101, at 346 (“I find it particularly telling that not 
even the proponents of the mosaic theory have proposed answers for how the 
theory should apply.” (citing Smith et al., supra note 102)); see also Brief of 
Yale Law School Information Society Project Scholars and Other Experts in 
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Yet even if a standard could be reasonably set, the mosaic 
theory is further flawed because of its continued reliance on a 
search/nonsearch distinction. Under the theory, aggregation of 
data amounting to a mosaic constitutes a search subject to the 
full warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment, but only slightly fewer data points entirely evade 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Such a wide gap between out-
comes separated by so little additional aggregation will lead to 
arbitrary and inconsistent results. To make matters worse, the 
threshold between search and nonsearch may not be apparent 
to either the individual under surveillance or to law enforce-
ment compiling the final piece of the puzzle. This means that 
neither the citizen nor the police officer knows where the 
boundary lines are ex ante in terms of conduct, but only ex post 
in terms of results.  
B. CATEGORIZATION 
In search of a solution to the third party doctrine problem, 
other authors have taken to categorization as a means of artic-
ulating coherent Fourth Amendment principles.104 The critical 
benefit of such an approach is to give clearer ex ante commands 
than would be possible under the mosaic approach. In turn, 
this puts great pressure on the ability to draw lines around cer-
tain forms of communication or conduct that can be subject to a 
clearer regulatory approach. The categorization strategy there-
fore typically identifies a special category for exemption, relies 
on empirical studies, or creates a totally new scheme. 
One strategy is to identify certain categories of information 
particularly well suited for exemption from the current third 
party doctrine; these categories typically are identified in the 
digital sphere and thus sit on the forefront of technological 
change. Social networking data is one particularly compelling 
category.105 Arguments in favor of heightened protections for 
 
the Law of Privacy and Technology as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
25–27, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 4614429, at *25–27. 
 104. See Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 309 (2003) (noting that although there “exists 
among privacy scholars a general consensus that privacy law and theory must 
change to meet the needs of the digital age,” no agreement on achieving that 
goal has appeared). 
 105. See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the 
Third Party Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 27 (2013); Saby 
Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale for Reinterpreting the Third-Party 
Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 33, 67–68 (2011); 
Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 31 MISS. C. L. 
REV. 227, 247 (2012); Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and 
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social networks proceed both from a Fourth Amendment ba-
sis—arguing that individuals have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in social networking data106—and from a First Amend-
ment basis—arguing that protections are needed lest law en-
forcement activity chill novel digital communication.107 As social 
relationships and interactions increasingly extend into cyber-
space, scholars argue, courts should extend the protections typ-
ically afforded to such interactions when they occur in the ana-
log world.108 As one scholar puts it, putting information on the 
Internet does not make it any less private because “life in the 
twenty-first century occurs in cyberspace.”109 
Yet identifying which data constitute social networking in-
formation can prove difficult. Different theories such as “inter-
personal privacy,”110 “technosocial extension,”111 and “[f]reedom 
of [a]ssociation [f]ramework”112 attempt to draw lines between 
less important digital communication, which the police are free 
to intercept, and data requiring protection. For example, one 
scholar attempts to differentiate a permissible law enforcement 
sting in a public chat room from a police officer’s “friending” a 
suspect on Facebook with a fake account, because the former is 
more similar to interactions that occur in a public space.113 Yet 
both appear to contain an element of voluntary disclosure or 
waiver, making it difficult to cleanly identify one as more pub-
lic than the other.114 Even if the line could be drawn, what 
 
Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. 
REV. 614, 675 (2011). 
 106. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 105, at 239. 
 107. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Net-
worked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 
B.C. L. REV. 741, 795 (2008); see also id. at 751 (“For these emergent associa-
tions, and even for traditional associations that make extensive use of digital 
communications, the potential chilling effects of relational surveillance are 
profound.”). 
 108. See Strandburg, supra note 105. 
 109. Ghoshray, supra note 105, at 67. 
 110. Bedi, supra note 105, at 59 (advocating the protection of Facebook 
friendships because they maintain the same aspects of “interpersonal privacy” 
as offline relationships). 
 111. Strandburg, supra note 105, at 664 (defining social networks as “a 
technosocial extension of the home or office”). 
 112. Strandburg, supra note 107 (advocating for judges to “view the Fourth 
Amendment through a special First Amendment lens in cases implicating ex-
pressive activity”); see also Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Crimi-
nal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 163 (2007) (suggesting that the First 
Amendment can provide an independent means for protecting third party in-
formation from government investigation).  
 113. See Strandburg, supra note 105, at 671–75. 
 114. See Bedi, supra note 105, at 28 (“It is not clear why these types of dis-
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about activity that falls between the two, such as gaining ac-
cess to a members-only message board? 
Categorization based on empirical studies is another strat-
egy for updating the third party doctrine. Advocates of this 
strategy utilize survey data to test the public’s reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in various areas.115 Professor Christopher 
Slobogin has conducted the most comprehensive such study, at-
tempting to measure the public’s perception of the level of in-
trusiveness of different government interventions.116 Slobogin 
uses these data to inform his longstanding proportionality pro-
posal for the Fourth Amendment, in which different levels of 
protection shield various categories of information.117 Under 
this theory, the more intrusive the public regards a police tac-
tic, the greater protection the third party information implicat-
ed receives.118 Thus, records about a corporation would require 
a subpoena supported by the relevance standard, whereas pub-
licly held personal records could be accessed with a “Terry Or-
 
closures do not stand or fall together . . . .”). 
 115. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That 
What Katz Is Made of?, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 781, 829 (2008) (advocating for 
use of empirical data in future Fourth Amendment decisions); Tokson, supra 
note 50, at 622–27; Sonia K. McNeil, Note, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 199, 215 (2011) (“[T]he Court’s interpretation of the third-
party doctrine has fallen out of step with the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the 
people whom the Fourth Amendment protects. Empirical evidence offers one 
way to resolve the dissonance between the Court’s opinion and public opin-
ion.”); see also Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth 
Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 46–49 (2011) (us-
ing Tokson’s survey). 
 116. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expecta-
tions of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical 
Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 
727, 728 (1993) (examining an extensive survey in which 217 subjects were 
presented with questions intending to determine their perception of intrusive-
ness in response to fifty scenarios). 
 117. Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of 
the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1082 (1998). Though 
Professor Slobogin identifies Terry v. Ohio as valuable inspiration for a reex-
amination of the third party doctrine, he focuses on the proportionality princi-
ples instead of the usefulness of the Court’s one-time balancing. Compare id. 
at 1056–57 (“This relaxation of the probable cause standard can be, and large-
ly was, justified on proportionality grounds . . . .”), with infra Part IV (advocat-
ing for an evaluation of reasonableness in third party searches).  
 118. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 116, at 757–58 (“Under propor-
tionality analysis, rankings [of search intrusiveness] . . . would serve as a use-
ful device for determining how much ‘probable cause’ is necessary to conduct a 
particular search or seizure.”). 
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der,” in effect a warrant supported by reasonable suspicion ra-
ther than probable cause.119  
The proportionality model, however, suffers from two ma-
jor shortcomings: unreliable data and rigidity. First, surveys 
are a poor way to measure expectations of privacy. Not only are 
surveys difficult to administer,120 quickly out of date,121 and 
highly sensitive to slight variations in phrasing,122 but also re-
spondents tend to overstate privacy interests.123 Of course, 
courts can ascribe different degrees of protection based upon 
sensitivity without recourse to survey data. Professor Orin Kerr 
has noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court has taken this 
approach, “appl[ying] a balancing test that considers ‘the type 
of protection’ that should be afforded ‘in the face of legitimate 
investigative needs’ that ‘will arise [and] justify State intrusion 
upon that interest.’”124 Yet while such proportional approaches 
at first appear quite flexible, their reliance on categorization 
breeds rigid and potentially arbitrary line-drawing.125 While 
Slobogin has added a “quasi-private” category to his initial dis-
tinction between publicly and privately held records, for exam-
ple,126 one cannot envy the jurist forced to distinguish private 
records from quasi-private records, and quasi-private records 
from public records, in an endless series of technologically 
evolving iterations. 
 
 119. Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 
MISS. L.J. 139, 169 (2005). 
 120. Tal Z. Zarsky, Governmental Data Mining and Its Alternatives, 116 
PENN ST. L. REV. 285, 320–21 (2011) (“Yet administering such surveys would 
be a very difficult, perhaps near-impossible task.”). 
 121. Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 951, 964–65 (2009) (“[W]hat if public opinion changes over time—should 
the courts change the rule when public opinion changes, such as after a terror-
ist attack or the release of an influential movie about surveillance?”). 
 122. Id. at 964 (“Survey responses can be highly sensitive to the audience, 
to the phrasing of the question, and to the timing of the survey.”). 
 123. Daniel J. Solove, Essay, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. 
REV. 1511, 1522–24 (2010) (outlining academic research indicating survey re-
spondents overstate privacy interests when compared to their revealed prefer-
ences, as the same individuals willingly give up privacy for small benefits). 
 124. See Kerr, supra note 121, at 965 (latter alteration in original) (quoting 
State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 35 (N.J. 2008); State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866, 
875 (N.J. 2005)). 
 125. See id. at 964 (“Slobogin’s approach also appears unnecessarily com-
plicated.”). 
 126. Compare SLOBOGIN, supra note 54 (containing an updated chart with 
more categories), with Slobogin, supra note 119 (using a chart to demonstrate 
proposed categories). 
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Most ambitiously, a final strategy attempts to completely 
reframe the protective scheme for third party material through 
categorization. In one well-thought-out example, Professor 
Daniel Solove attempts to “[r]econstruct[] the [a]rchitecture” by 
drawing a new line in the sand for the protection of third party 
material.127 He proposes borrowing from the Privacy Act, disal-
lowing the government from obtaining without legal process 
any “system of records,” defined as “a group of any records . . . 
from which information is retrieved by the name of the individ-
ual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying 
particular assigned to the individual.”128 This distinction, he 
claims, separates information obtained coercively by the pri-
vate sector or hospitals from that given freely to friends and 
neighbors.129 But if the third party doctrine as it currently ex-
ists is overly lenient toward the government, restricting access 
to any system of records is likely too burdensome.130 
Ultimately, the categorical approach has not yielded a sat-
isfactory solution. Third party information may once have been 
susceptible to categorization, but as the types of information 
trusted to third parties proliferate and the need to divulge in-
formation to a variety of actors becomes unavoidable,131 such an 
endeavor becomes increasingly Sisyphean. The source of 
categorization’s demise may stem from its reliance on bright-
line rules—long thought to be incompatible with the Fourth 
Amendment.132 Judicially created rules have many pitfalls, in-
cluding their preemption of legislative alternatives;133 but it is 
bright-line rules’ inflexibility that most plagues categoriza-
 
 127. Solove, supra note 67, at 1151. 
 128. SOLOVE, supra note 57, at 214 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(5) (2012)). 
 129. See id. at 216 (“Currently, employers and landlords have a substantial 
amount of power to extort personal information.”).  
 130. See Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: 
Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 
PEPP. L. REV. 975, 1019 (2007) (“Solove’s solution is overinclusive. It would re-
quire probable cause before the police could obtain everything from basic sub-
scriber information to the most personal of records.” (footnote omitted)). 
 131. SOLOVE, supra note 57, at 216 (“[P]eople . . . have little choice but to 
hand over information to third parties. Life in the Information Age depends 
upon sharing information with a host of third party companies.”). 
 132. See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 230 (1984) (describing Professor Wayne 
LaFave’s longstanding opposition to bright line rules in the Fourth Amend-
ment context). 
 133. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 51 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (“It would be far wiser to give legislators an unimpeded opportunity to 
grapple with these emerging issues rather than to shackle them with prema-
turely devised constitutional constraints.”). 
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tion.134 In the ever-evolving and expanding world of digital in-
formation,135 the inflexibility of bright-line rules will lead inevi-
tably to difficulties in administration.136 Under such a system, 
judges would be left with the unenviable task of creating new 
categories—further complicating an already complex scheme—
or making unjust decisions, potentially damaging the court’s 
credibility.137 
C. BALANCING 
A third approach for rethinking the third party doctrine re-
lies on a single inquiry into reasonableness. Most famously, 
Professor Akhil Amar argues that the Fourth Amendment’s 
Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses are disjunctive, and 
should be read without reference to one another.138 Thus, inves-
tigatory tactics should be evaluated not with reference to prob-
able cause or the existence of a warrant, but only with regard 
to the reasonableness of law enforcement action.139 Reasonable-
ness being a broad inquiry, Amar outlines the potential process 
through which judges could look for reasonableness: “Common 
sense tells us to look beyond probability to the importance of 
finding what the government is looking for, the intrusiveness of 
the search, the identity of the search target, the availability of 
other means of achieving the purpose of the search, and so 
on.”140 Fourth Amendment decision-making, then, requires bal-
 
 134. See Joshua S. Levy, Towards a Brighter Fourth Amendment: Privacy 
and Technological Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 502, 517 (2011) (cataloguing 
the pitfalls of bright line rules for the Fourth Amendment). 
 135. See, e.g., Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls?: 
Call Location Information and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
381, 381–82 (2003) (describing how cell phone data—shared with cellular pro-
viders—is rapidly expanding and easily accessed). 
 136. See Levy, supra note 134 (“[C]ourts should only adopt bright-line rules 
for activities that are recurring in nature, clearly understandable, and affected 
by rapid technological changes.”). 
 137. Id. (“Incorrect or unjust results risk severely damaging the institu-
tional credibility of the judiciary.”). 
 138. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. 
L. REV. 757, 761 (1994) (“The words of the Fourth Amendment really do mean 
what they say. They do not require warrants, even presumptively, for searches 
and seizures. They do not require probable cause for all searches and seizures 
without warrants.”). Amar relies on colonial-era cases to argue that the War-
rant Clause, along with the probable cause requirement, was merely intended 
to address the founders’ fears of general warrants. Id. at 772 (citing Wilkes v. 
Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489; 19 Howell’s State Trials 1153). 
 139. See id. at 801 (“The core of the Fourth Amendment, as we have seen, 
is neither a warrant nor probable cause, but reasonableness.”). 
 140. Id. Amar goes on to note how law enforcement tactics’ reasonableness 
can be greatly affected by implication of some other protected constitutional 
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ancing all interests—from the perspective of the community—
to determine a search’s reasonability.141 
While Amar is right that the Supreme Court long ago re-
jected such a freewheeling inquiry for all Fourth Amendment 
questions,142 at times the Court has looked to reasonableness to 
guide its jurisprudence. A prime example is the “special needs 
doctrine,”143 applicable in “exceptional circumstances in which 
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, 
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impractica-
ble.”144 In such a situation, courts use a balancing test145 to 
evaluate the reasonableness of the proposed activity.146 This 
balancing measures the government’s intrusion on Fourth 
Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate gov-
ernmental interests.147 The Supreme Court identified three fac-
tors for evaluation: “(1) ‘the nature of the privacy interest alleg-
edly compromised by the [challenged governmental 
conduct],’ (2) ‘the character of the intrusion imposed by the 
[challenged conduct],’ and (3) ‘the nature and immediacy of the 
[state’s] concerns and the efficacy of the [governmental con-
duct] in meeting them.’”148 
Close examination of the special needs doctrine reveals the 
difficulties with applying Amar’s uniform reasonability test to 
third party material. Beyond the typical criticisms of balancing 
tests such as their susceptibility to judicial policymaking,149 
 
right. Id. at 804–11. He terms this modification of the inquiry “constitutional 
reasonableness.” Id. at 804. 
 141. See id. at 780–82 (explaining that juries, whose opinions reflect the 
community, are the proper vehicle for the weighing of interests). 
 142. Id. at 757, 761 (referring to Fourth Amendment doctrine as an “em-
barrassment” and a “mess” for its failure to seize on a simpler framework). 
 143. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 5 SEARCH & SEIZURE § 10 (5th ed. 
2012) (describing inspections and administrative searches); Antoine McNama-
ra, The “Special Needs” of Prison, Probation, and Parole, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
209, 212–21 (2007) (offering an overview of special needs jurisprudence). 
 144. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). 
 145. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002) (approving 
suspicionless drug testing for high school students who participate in extra-
curricular activities). 
 146. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 (“The determination of the standard of reason-
ableness governing any specific class of searches requires ‘balancing the need 
to search against the invasion which the search entails.’” (quoting Camara v. 
Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)). 
 147. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995) 
(quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)). 
 148. Palmieri v. Lynch, 392 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2004) (alterations in origi-
nal) (citations omitted) (quoting Earls, 536 U.S. at 830, 832, 834). 
 149. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 
2016] RESTORING REASON 1011 
 
pure reasonability is impractical outside special needs cases. 
The difficulty once again is in crafting a doctrine that can guide 
ex ante behavior by law enforcement. When addressing consti-
tutional challenges to specific governmental initiatives in the 
special needs context—whether searches of school lockers for 
drugs150 or roadblocks of motorists for driving under the influ-
ence151—the Court can step back to examine a government pro-
gram in its entirety before identifying and weighing interests. 
Asking law enforcement officers to make the same judgments 
before seeking each phone record defies reality.152 These con-
cerns led to the Court’s recognition that “a responsible Fourth 
Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring 
sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need, lest 
every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an 
occasion for constitutional review.”153 As Professor Anthony 
Amsterdam recognized, relying on reasonableness alone “con-
verts the fourth amendment into one immense Rorschach 
blot.”154 
The problem with Amar’s framework, however, is not the 
recourse to the Reasonableness Clause, but the particular ap-
plication of the clause. In the next Part we argue that, even 
within the Fourth Amendment’s current framework (which by 
default conflates reasonableness with a warrant), third party 
searches fit comfortably within the category of searches ana-
lyzed under the Reasonableness Clause. And in Part IV, we go 
on to demonstrate a workable model for applying this clause to 
third party searches. 
III.  THIRD PARTY SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT’S TWO CLAUSES   
As noted in Part I, five justices of the Supreme Court ap-
pear to have recognized that third party searches cannot be 
categorically excluded from the ambit of the Fourth Amend-
 
HARV. L. REV. 820, 855 (1994) (criticizing Amar’s “reasonableness” approach 
because it is similar to “rational basis” review, which has proven to be no scru-
tiny at all). 
 150. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328–29. 
 151. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1990). 
 152. See Wayne B. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus “Stand-
ardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141 (de-
scribing the need for Fourth Amendment law to be “readily applicable by the 
police”). 
 153. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001). 
 154. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 393 (1974).  
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ment. At the same time, there is widespread (though hardly 
unanimous) scholarly agreement that the third party doctrine 
can neither be maintained in its current absolute form nor 
scrapped entirely.155 But even those courts willing to rethink 
the third party doctrine have fallen into the pattern of treating 
the question as one of an on/off switch. These courts focus al-
most entirely on whether the Fourth Amendment should come 
into play at all—i.e., whether an investigatory technique is a 
search or not—rather than the extent to which the Fourth 
Amendment should come into play.156 The operational assump-
tion is that if the Fourth Amendment applies, the challenged 
practice must adhere to the probable cause and warrant re-
quirements—a Fourth Amendment variant of the “‘strict’ in 
theory and fatal in fact” standard of review under the Equal 
Protection Clause.157 But the Fourth Amendment, after all, con-
tains not one but two clauses: the Warrant Clause and the Rea-
sonableness Clause.158 Instead of continuing to chafe against 
the ill-fitting mantle of the search/nonsearch distinction, courts 
should recognize third party searches as another of the excep-
tions to the warrant requirement, and accordingly craft a rea-
sonableness test to gauge when third party searches are consti-
tutionally appropriate.159 
In this Part, we first provide an overview of the Warrant 
Clause exceptions that have been recognized by the Court, 
drawing out their key features. We then examine the third par-
ty doctrine, demonstrating its doctrinal fit among these excep-
tions. Finally, we argue that the probable cause requirement of 
the Warrant Clause should not attach by default to third party 
searches, which should instead be governed by the Reasonable-
ness Clause. 
A. THE WARRANT EXCEPTIONS 
The Supreme Court has recognized a number of exceptions 
to the warrant requirement. These exceptions carry a variety of 
different rationales—some, such the arrest exceptions, stem 
 
 155. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra Part II.A.  
 157. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1972) (“Some situations evoked the aggressive ‘new’ equal protection, with 
scrutiny that was ‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the def-
erential ‘old’ equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and 
virtually none in fact.”). 
 158. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 159. See infra Part IV.C. 
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from the impracticability of obtaining a warrant,160 while oth-
ers, such as the vehicular search exceptions, involve diminished 
expectation of privacy or limited scope of intrusion.161 Generally 
speaking, however, the exceptions can be grouped into three 
categories.162 First, there are a handful of exceptions that dis-
pense with the warrant requirement for reasons of necessity or 
historical practice but maintain the probable cause standard 
unaltered. Second, there are certain narrowly drawn contexts 
in which the Court will dispense with individualized suspicion 
altogether, generally in the context of border searches or pro-
grammatic searches. And third, the Court has carved out and 
slowly expanded an intermediate category where officers may 
conduct a search or seizure based upon reasonable suspicion 
rather than probable cause.  
1. Probable Cause Without Warrants 
The Supreme Court has held that in limited circumstances, 
officers may take action implicating the Fourth Amendment 
without a warrant, subject to the action satisfying a probable 
 
 160. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975) (stating that re-
quiring a warrant prior to arrest is an “intolerable handicap for legitimate law 
enforcement”). 
 161. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (“The public is 
fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles because of this 
compelling governmental need for regulation.”); South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) (“[L]ess rigorous warrant requirements govern be-
cause the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significant-
ly less than that relating to one’s home or office.”). 
 162. Some sources identify three additional types of warrantless searches 
and seizures: plain view seizures, consent searches, and searches and seizures 
of abandoned property. See, e.g., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 42 GEO. 
L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 46, 80–84, 96–112, 150–51 (2013). Plain view 
seizures rest upon the principle that an incriminating item discovered during 
the course of legitimate police activity—whether a search or not a search—
may be seized without a warrant. E.g., id. at 80–82. As the Court noted in 
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738–39 (1983), “‘[p]lain view’ is perhaps better 
understood, therefore, not as an independent ‘exception’ to the Warrant 
Clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an 
officer’s ‘access to an object’ may be.” Consent searches, meanwhile, constitute 
a waiver of the Fourth Amendment’s applicability entirely, see Zap v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946), vacated, 330 U.S. 800 (1947), albeit a waiver 
confined to a reasonable understanding of the waiver’s scope, see Florida v. 
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250–51 (1991). Similarly, one who has abandoned prop-
erty has relinquished a Fourth Amendment interest in it. See Abel v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“There can be noth-
ing unlawful in the Government’s appropriation of . . . abandoned property.” 
(citation omitted)). As such, we do not consider these types of searches and 
seizures as separate exceptions to the warrant requirement here. 
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cause standard.163 First, the Court has stated that a warrant-
less arrest can occur where “officers have probable cause to be-
lieve that a person has committed a crime in their presence.”164 
The Court has not spent a great deal of time justifying this ex-
ception, but has noted at various points that warrantless ar-
rests were “‘taken for granted’ at the founding,”165 and that a 
warrant requirement for arrests for crimes committed in front 
of officers would constitute an “intolerable handicap for legiti-
mate law enforcement.”166  
Second, it is a “settled rule that warrantless arrests in pub-
lic places are valid” where supported by probable cause,167 
though there has been even less effort put into justifying this 
result (a point Amar has seized upon to cast doubt upon the 
general applicability of the warrant requirement168). Most cases 
trace the rule back to Carroll v. United States,169 which offered 
merely that “the reason for arrest without warrant on a reliable 
report of a felony was because the public safety and the due ap-
prehension of criminals charged with heinous offenses required 
that such arrests should be made at once without warrant.”170 
The Court appears to balance this public safety need against 
the interest in the sanctity of the home protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, thus finding that arrests upon probable cause re-
quire a warrant within the home but do not require a warrant 
in public.171 
Third, the Court has sanctioned dispensing with the war-
rant requirement for searches and seizures in exigent circum-
stances.172 For exigent circumstances to excuse the need for a 
warrant, the Court has made clear that “police officers need . . . 
 
 163. See Pugh, 420 U.S. at 120 (“The standard is the same as that for ar-
rest.”). 
 164. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 165. Id. at 170 (majority opinion) (citing TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 45 (1969)). 
 166. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 113. 
 167. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980). 
 168. Amar, supra note 138, at 764. 
 169. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
 170. Id. at 157. 
 171. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586–87 (“[S]earches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable . . . [but] objects such as 
weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the police 
without a warrant.”). 
 172. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978) (stating that 
officers usually require warrants unless exigent circumstances override 
Fourth Amendment concerns). 
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probable cause plus exigent circumstances.”173 The Court has 
identified a variety of “exigencies of the situation [that] make 
the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrant-
less search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment,”174 including the need to render emergency aid, hot pur-
suit of a fleeing suspect, and the danger of destruction of 
evidence.175 
The final context in which the Court has allowed warrant-
less action while maintaining the probable cause requirement 
is for searches of vehicles.176 The Court initially rested this 
waiver of the warrant requirement upon the portable nature of 
automobiles and the risk that evidence would move beyond the 
officer’s control or jurisdiction before a warrant could be ob-
tained.177 However, the Court has made clear that “[b]esides the 
element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern 
because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s auto-
mobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or 
office.”178 And in fact, the Court has “upheld warrantless 
searches where no immediate danger was presented that the 
car would be removed from the jurisdiction,”179 including after 
the vehicle has already been impounded.180 In these cases, it 
would appear that the lesser expectation of privacy provides an 
independently sufficient justification to dispense with the war-
rant requirement. 
2. Searches Without Individualized Suspicion 
Several warrant exceptions dealing with searches in “ex-
ceptional”181 circumstances dispense with the individualized 
 
 173. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (allowing officers to enter 
a home under exigent circumstances). 
 174. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394. 
 175. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459–60 (2011). One wrinkle, orthogo-
nal to this discussion, is that the officers need only “an objectively reasonable 
basis for believing” that the exigent circumstance at issue exists. Brigham 
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006). 
 176. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1985) (holding that a 
warrantless vehicular search was not unreasonable because the officers had 
probable cause). 
 177. See id. at 390–91. 
 178. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 & n.10 (1970) (finding no dif-
ference under the Fourth Amendment between searching a vehicle immediate-
ly and searching it after impoundment). 
 181. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (noting that the Court has recognized certain exceptional circumstances 
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suspicion requirement altogether. First, the border has long 
been held to a different standard, operating on a sliding scale of 
suspicion needed to justify increasingly obtrusive searches. For 
example, routine stops at fixed border points may be conducted 
without any individualized suspicion,182 while detention beyond 
the scope of routine inspection requires reasonable suspicion.183 
The Court justified these practices by noting that “not only is 
the expectation of privacy less at the border than in the interi-
or, [but] the Fourth Amendment balance between the interests 
of the Government and the privacy right of the individual is al-
so struck much more favorably to the Government at the bor-
der.”184  
Another well-established exception to the Warrant Clause 
is searches incident to arrest. “The exception derives from in-
terests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typi-
cally implicated in arrest situations.”185 Where the police make 
a valid arrest, they are permitted to search “the person of the 
arrestee . . . [and] the area within the control of the arrestee.”186 
Both types of searches must be reasonable in scope (and have 
been the subject of considerable contestation over scope),187 but 
individualized suspicion is not required.188 Similarly, upon tak-
ing property into custody, the police may inventory it according 
to standardized procedures without any individualized suspi-
cion.189 As discussed above, the scope of the search-incident-to-
arrest exception has recently been constricted by Riley v. Cali-
 
under which warrant and probable-cause requirements are impracticable). 
 182. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985). 
 183. Id. at 541. 
 184. Id. at 539–40 (citations omitted). A similar scheme prevails with re-
gard to Coast Guard inspections at sea. See United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 591 (1983) (observing that the government’s interests 
in regulating sea traffic are more substantial at checkpoints where vessels de-
part to foreign ports). 
 185. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009). 
 186. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (emphasis omit-
ted). 
 187. See, e.g., Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 (surveying the turbulent legal history 
of searches of vehicles pursuant to arrest of an occupant); Winston v. Lee, 470 
U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (holding it unreasonable to surgically extract a bullet). To 
many observers, Gant further threw into confusion the permissible scope of a 
search incident to arrest as it pertains to vehicle occupants. See, e.g., George 
M. Dery III, A Case of Doubtful Certainty: The Court Relapses into Search In-
cident to Arrest Confusion in Arizona v. Gant, 44 IND. L. REV. 395, 396 (2011) 
(“Gant . . . may lead to further confusion in this troubled area of Fourth 
Amendment litigation.”). 
 188. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234–35. 
 189. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1987). 
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fornia,190 but outside of cellphones and perhaps other electronic 
devices the core features of the exception remain intact.191 
A final category falls under the catch-all of “special needs,” 
also examined in Part II. The Court has held that “[i]n limited 
circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the 
search are minimal, and where an important governmental in-
terest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by 
a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be rea-
sonable despite the absence of such suspicion.”192 The govern-
mental interest must go “beyond the normal need for law en-
forcement . . . .”193 Accordingly, the Court has upheld mandatory 
drug tests in some contexts, such as for high school athletes,194 
but not in others, such as for pregnant mothers.195 One variant 
of such special needs searches are administrative searches of 
“pervasively regulated industries.”196 In such cases, where “the 
privacy interests of the owner are weakened and the govern-
ment interests in regulating particular businesses are concomi-
tantly heightened,” the government can craft a regulatory 
scheme that dispenses with warrants and with individualized 
suspicion.197 
3. Searches and Seizures upon Reasonable Suspicion 
The final category of exceptions to the Warrant Clause in-
volves a pure application of the Fourth Amendment’s second 
clause: that searches and seizures must be reasonable. In Terry 
v. Ohio,198 to be explored in more depth in Part IV, the Court 
permitted officers to make investigatory stops of persons on the 
basis of reasonable suspicion without a warrant. Writing for 
the majority, Chief Justice Warren focused on three primary 
rationales for allowing the police to proceed without a warrant. 
First, it is simply impracticable (if not impossible) for the police 
to obtain a warrant at every investigatory encounter on the 
street. The Court found that such “police conduct—necessarily 
 
 190. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (declining to extend Robinson to an ar-
restee’s cellphone). 
 191. Id. at 2493–94 (stating that the Court’s exception for cellphones did 
not otherwise disturb the doctrine).  
 192. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989). 
 193. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)). 
 194. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–66 (1995). 
 195. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76–86 (2001). 
 196. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 693 (1987). 
 197. Id. at 702. 
 198. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the 
officer on the beat—. . . historically has not been, and as a prac-
tical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant proce-
dure.”199 Second, there is an important “need for law enforce-
ment officers to protect themselves and other prospective vic-
victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable 
cause for an arrest.”200 And third, “[a]n arrest is a wholly differ-
ent kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited 
search for weapons . . . .”201 Whereas an arrest involves signifi-
cant infringement upon personal liberty, a Terry stop “consti-
tutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon 
the sanctity of the person.”202 Weighing these three factors, the 
Court’s “evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck 
in this type of case” led it to conclude that police should possess 
a narrowly drawn stop-and-frisk authority without a warrant 
requirement and upon reasonable suspicion.203 
Two rationales that the Court declined to pursue in Terry 
are worth noting. First was the Ohio Court of Appeals’ sugges-
tion that a “stop and frisk” should be excluded from the defini-
tion of search or seizure entirely, and thus moved outside the 
purview of the Fourth Amendment.204 Second, the majority did 
not adopt Justice Douglas’s exhortation in dissent that the 
Court retain the probable cause standard despite discarding 
the warrant requirement.205 The majority’s “evaluation of the 
proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case” led it, 
instead, to the reasonable suspicion standard.206  
In United States v. Place,207 the Court considered whether 
to extend the reasoning of Terry to the detention of luggage at 
airports. The Court held that “seizures on the basis of reasona-
ble, articulable suspicion, premised on objective facts, that the 
luggage contains contraband or evidence of a crime” were valid 
under the Fourth Amendment.208 Following the formula laid 
down by Terry, the Court “balance[d] the nature and quality of 
the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 
 
 199. Id. at 20. 
 200. Id. at 24. 
 201. Id. at 26. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 27. 
 204. See id. at 16–20, 16 n.12 (citing State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 120 
(Ohio 1966)). 
 205. See id. at 35–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 206. Id. at 27 (majority opinion). 
 207. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
 208. Id. at 702. 
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against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to 
justify the intrusion.”209 As in Terry, the Court pointed to the 
government’s interest in detecting and preventing crime; in 
Place, however, the Court lacked (and found unnecessary) the 
officer safety rationale upon which Terry had, in part, rested.210 
The Court also noted “the inherently transient nature of drug 
courier activity at airports,” and rejected the respondents’ ar-
gument that “a generalized interest in law enforcement” could 
not “justify an intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests in the absence of probable cause.”211 Set against these 
governmental interests, the Court found that “[t]he intrusion 
on possessory interests occasioned by a seizure of one’s person-
al effects can vary both in its nature and extent.”212 Where the 
detention was only temporary and the examination of the prop-
erty did not independently violate the Fourth Amendment, de-
tention on reasonable suspicion would be valid.213 
4. Common Themes 
A handful of common themes emerge from these scattered 
warrant exceptions: the practicality of obtaining a warrant, 
whether there is a diminished expectation of privacy, and the 
significance of the law enforcement interest. The first, distinct-
ly not applicable to run-of-the-mill third party searches, is that 
of the practical impossibility of the interposition of a magistrate 
between officer and search. There is little risk that data or doc-
uments held by third parties will drive off into the sunset be-
fore the officer can secure a warrant, as with vehicles, or that a 
suspect will destroy them or use them for violence against offic-
ers, as with searches incident to arrest.  
But practical impossibility is not a necessary condition for 
warrantless searches; significant as well is the privacy interest 
at stake. As noted above, the Court has found a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy in vehicles sufficient to justify dispensing 
with the warrant requirement even where mobility concerns 
 
 209. Id. at 703. 
 210. Id. at 703–04. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 705. Interestingly, the Court offered an example of a situation in 
which expectations of privacy could be diminished: “[t]he seizure may be made 
after the owner has relinquished control of the property to a third party or, as 
here, from the immediate custody and control of the owner.” Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 213. The Court held in Place that the ninety-minute detention exceeded the 
permissible scope of a Terry stop. Id. at 709–10. 
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are obviated.214 The exception for administrative searches of 
closely regulated industries does not depend upon the impossi-
bility of obtaining prior approval, but rather upon the owner’s 
diminished expectation of privacy.215 And in other contexts 
where practicality is at play, such as Terry stops and border 
searches, the Court has been careful to note as well a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy where it has abandoned the war-
rant requirement (and particularly where it has lowered the 
probable cause threshold).216 
In addition to the degree of expectation of privacy, the 
Court has often looked to the countervailing government inter-
est. In the context of special needs, the Court has stated that 
the government interest must be distinct from (though not nec-
essarily to the exclusion of) ordinary law enforcement.217 But 
this is not a general rule: in extending Terry stops to luggage, 
the Court in Place rejected the proposition that, “absent some 
special law enforcement interest such as officer safety, a gener-
alized interest in law enforcement cannot justify an intrusion 
on an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests in the absence 
of probable cause.”218 
B. SHOULD THIRD PARTY SEARCHES REQUIRE A WARRANT? 
Looking to the factors the Court has highlighted as favor-
ing an exception from the warrant requirement, the most sali-
ent for third party searches are law enforcement needs and a 
reduced expectation of privacy. As noted above, third party 
searches could, in circumstances not covered independently by 
the exigent circumstances exception, be preapproved by a neu-
tral magistrate. But as the Court said in United States v. 
 
 214. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) (discussing 
the traditional distinction between automobiles and homes or offices in the 
context of the Fourth Amendment). 
 215. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (recognizing the 
lessened application of warrant and probable cause requirements in the con-
text of a closely regulated industry). 
 216. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539 (1985) 
(identifying the lessened expectation of privacy at the border compared to the 
interior); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (rejecting the argument that an 
officer is unjustified in making an intrusion short of an arrest absent evidence 
sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a 
crime). 
 217. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring) (arguing that the Court uses a balancing test only in the context of “a 
special law enforcement need for greater flexibility”). 
 218. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703–04 (1983). 
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Rabinowitz,219 “[a] rule of thumb requiring that a search war-
rant always be procured whenever practicable may be appeal-
ing from the vantage point of easy administration. But we can-
not agree that this requirement should be crystallized into a 
sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search.”220 The constitu-
tional imposition of a warrant requirement would both overpro-
tect information in which individuals have a diminished expec-
tation of privacy and unduly hamper law enforcement interests. 
1. Diminished Expectation of Privacy 
In addition to the significant government interest in access 
to third party records, the Court has repeatedly recognized a 
diminished expectation of privacy in such records.221 Of course, 
the Court’s declaration, that “a person has no legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to 
third parties,”222 has been roundly condemned. But even if a 
person does not entirely lack a legitimate expectation in priva-
cy, it does not necessarily follow that her expectation of privacy 
is not at all diminished. Accepting that there are diminished—
but not nonexistent—expectations of privacy in third party rec-
ords would, unlike the approach of Miller and Smith, render 
the Fourth Amendment applicable to such searches. As the 
Court noted in Riley, “[t]he fact that an arrestee has dimin-
ished privacy interests does not mean that the Fourth Amend-
ment falls out of the picture entirely.”223 
It is widely recognized that individuals cannot, or should 
not, actually expect all of the information disclosed to third 
parties to remain private. Justice Alito, concurring in Jones, 
acknowledged that “even if the public does not welcome the 
diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they may 
eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevita-
ble.”224 But what are we to make of this inevitability? The Mil-
ler Court implicitly analogized this potential exposure to the 
common law doctrine of assumption of risk: a “depositor takes 
 
 219. 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752 (1969). 
 220. Id. at 65. 
 221. Cf. Place, 462 U.S. at 705 (“The intrusion on possessory interests occa-
sioned by a seizure of one’s personal effects can vary both in its nature and ex-
tent. The seizure may be made after the owner has relinquished control of the 
property to a third party . . . .”). 
 222. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (emphasis added). 
 223. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014). 
 224. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concur-
ring). 
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the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the infor-
mation will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”225 
Kerr has picked up on this notion of assumption of risk to argue 
that the depositor (or other person engaging in transactions 
with third parties) has voluntarily consented to the disclo-
sure.226 
Epstein has powerfully critiqued the idea that knowledge of 
risk is analytically equivalent to assumption of risk in this con-
text because individuals cannot contract out of it: “The sup-
posed assumption of the risk is forced on individuals by positive 
law. It is not consensually assumed.”227 Such an approach finds 
some support in Georgia v. Randolph,228 in which the Court re-
fused to recognize a co-occupant’s consent to search an apart-
ment where the physically present defendant refused entry.229 
The Randolph majority critiqued “the dissent’s easy assump-
tion that privacy shared with another individual is privacy 
waived for all purposes including warrantless searches by the 
police.”230 Defenders of the traditional third party doctrine 
might respond that an individual could simply decline to con-
tract with third parties whenever they seek to keep given in-
formation private, but such an option may never have been 
practical,231 and certainly is even less so in the modern world.232 
And indeed, the Katz majority would likely find quite alien the 
notion that pervasive electronic surveillance, if carried out 
through third parties, could be justified under the rubric of 
consent.233 
So where does this leave us? According to Kerr and the 
Miller and Smith Courts, one’s knowledge that she is turning 
 
 225. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
 226. Kerr, supra note 2, at 588–90. 
 227. Epstein, supra note 64, at 1206. 
 228. 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
 229. Id. at 122–23. 
 230. Id. at 115 n.4. 
 231. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749–50 (1979) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (“It is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as a practi-
cal matter, individuals have no realistic alternative.”). 
 232. Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties . . . is ill suited 
to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”). 
 233. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.22 (1967) (“A search to 
which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements, but of 
course ‘the usefulness of electronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to 
the suspect.’” (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463 (1963) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting)) (citing Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946))). 
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over her information to third parties—and potentially to the 
government—would defeat her reasonable expectation of priva-
cy under the Katz test. Yet according to Epstein,234 the Ran-
dolph majority, and the Jones concurrences, such knowledge 
should not constitute waiver. Faced with these conflicting sup-
portable positions, it seems clear that people retain a dimin-
ished, though not nonexistent, expectation of privacy in infor-
mation they disclose to third parties. 
2. Law Enforcement Needs 
The government has a substantial interest in access to in-
formation held in the hands of third parties. Of course, the gov-
ernment always has a law enforcement interest in escaping the 
strictures of the Warrant Clause. But “[a] generalized interest 
in expedient law enforcement cannot, without more, justify a 
warrantless search.”235 What the Court asks, in weighing an ex-
ception to the warrant requirement, is whether warrants would 
pose a particular burden in a given situation.236 In the case of 
third party searches, there are good reasons to find that this 
heightened law enforcement interest is present. 
As Epstein and Slobogin have pointed out, the Fourth 
Amendment (and in fact, the entirety of criminal procedure) 
operates on a graduated scale: ordinary police work operates 
outside the parameters of the Fourth Amendment, minimally 
intrusive searches are subject to reasonableness, more invasive 
searches and arrest require warrants and probable cause, and 
conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt.237 This pro-
 
 234. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 235. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115 n.5. These dicta in Randolph would appear 
to coexist uneasily with the Court’s rejection in Place of the “suggest[ion] that, 
absent some special law enforcement interest such as officer safety, a general-
ized interest in law enforcement cannot justify an intrusion on an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment interests in the absence of probable cause.” Place, 462 
U.S. at 703–04 (1983). In context, however, it is clear that the Place Court in-
tended to place the inquiry on the substantiality, rather than the type, of the 
law enforcement interest. See id. at 704 (“The test is whether those interests 
are sufficiently ‘substantial,’ not whether they are independent of the interest 
in investigating crimes effectively and apprehending suspects.” (quoting  
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981))). 
 236. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (“But we deal here with an 
entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift action predicated upon the 
on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically has not 
been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant proce-
dure.”). 
 237. Epstein, supra note 64, at 1211 (“The basic pattern is that in princi-
ple, it should take more to convict than it does to arrest, and more to arrest 
than it does to search, and more to search than it does to investigate.”); 
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gression was similarly noted by the Terry Court: “[I]n dealing 
with the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on 
city streets the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible 
responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information 
they possess.”238 
As argued in Part II, there is increasing recognition that 
third party searches—or at least some third party searches—
cannot be located on the lowest rung of that ladder. But it is 
equally unrealistic to think that the entire panoply of third 
party searches can be subject to the requirements necessary to 
effectuate a forcible entry into the home. As Kerr notes, “[t]he 
repeated use of nonsearch techniques has been considered an 
essential way to create probable cause that justifies searches 
rather than an unlawful search itself.”239 To prohibit any access 
to third party information would be “devastating to the legiti-
mate needs of law enforcement.”240 Although law enforcement’s 
use of third party information is difficult to quantify, the prac-
tice is widespread241 and by all accounts extraordinarily effec-
tive. As Slobogin points out, the warrant and probable cause 
requirements could pose an insurmountable barrier to standard 
police investigations.242 He explains: 
[I]magine that police want to find out from the phone company who 
called a murder victim in the two weeks prior to the murder (a sce-
nario often depicted on TV shows like Law & Order). While they 
would certainly be able to demonstrate the relevance of this . . . data, 
they would not have probable cause with respect to any of the callers, 
and thus would not be able to obtain the regulated subpoena for the 
phone company’s records . . . .243 
Lacking the ability to access third party information with-
out a warrant supported by probable cause, police tactics would 
revert to the pre-modern era, where officers must resort to pro-
hibitively expensive low-tech surveillance such as knocking on 
doors or staking out suspected criminals.244  
 
Slobogin, supra note 119, at 164–67. 
 238. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10. 
 239. Kerr, supra note 101, at 328. 
 240. Henderson, supra note 115, at 44. 
 241. See Dennis, supra note 102, at 757 (“[I]n 2004, federal law enforce-
ment utilized 10,874 pen register and trap and trace orders; by 2008, that 
number had almost doubled, to 20,889 orders.”). 
 242. See Slobogin, supra note 119, at 185.  
 243. Id. 
 244. See Blake Ellis Reid, Note, Substitution Effects: A Problematic Justifi-
cation for the Third-Party Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment, 8 J. ON TELE-
COMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 613, 620 (2010) (“Low-tech surveillance, such as 
committing officers to stakeouts and tracking work, is expensive—and funding 
of boots-on-the-ground police presence seems to be on a problematic decline in 
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Furthermore, requiring warrants for third party searches 
is even less feasible today than it would have been in the late 
1970s, when Smith and Miller were decided. The Court has 
signaled its awareness of “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of 
communication and information transmission,”245 and Kerr has 
noted that such changes “place[] more and more communica-
tions in the hands of third parties.”246 This change is, of course, 
a double-edged sword: the migration of personal transactions 
from the analog to the digital sphere heightens both the gov-
ernment interest in access and the individual’s interest in pro-
tection. But the government interest is particularly significant 
because of the growing threat of cybercrime, which takes place 
entirely across platforms controlled by third parties.247 For ex-
ample, “tracing an IP address is a common and effective way 
for authorities to identify perpetrators of cyberharassment 
crimes.”248 If drug courier activity at airports is sufficient to de-
prive luggage of the full protection of the Warrant Clause,249 the 
shift of criminal activity to the Internet should similarly push 
in favor of a warrant exception for third party searches.  
3. Applying the Rationales 
If an activity is to be deemed a search but excused from the 
warrant requirement, a specific exception must be made.250 
Such a burden is not easily overcome, but the third party doc-
trine shares two important features with other exceptions to 
the warrant requirement. Like the heightened law enforcement 
concerns over the border (as in United States v. Montoya de 
Hernandez251) or drug courier activity at airports (as in United 
 
the United States.”). 
 245. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010). 
 246. Kerr, supra note 2, at 566. 
 247. Cf. David Gray et al., Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. 
Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745, 759 (2013) (“[T]he third-party doc-
trine[] play[s] a critical role in law enforcement’s efforts to detect and prose-
cute many crimes, particularly cybercrimes.”).  
 248. Id. at 797. 
 249. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983) (“Because of the 
inherently transient nature of drug courier activity at airports, allowing police 
to make brief investigative stops of persons at airports on reasonable suspicion 
of drug-trafficking substantially enhances the likelihood that police will be 
able to prevent the flow of narcotics into distribution channels.”). 
 250. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (“In the absence of 
a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to 
the warrant requirement.”). 
 251. 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985). 
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States v. Place252), third party searches implicate a zone of spe-
cial law enforcement concern. And as with vehicles (as in Ari-
zona v. Gant253) and closely regulated industries (as in New 
York v. Burger254), the intrusion on personal privacy is limited 
by the diminished expectation of privacy. Given the current 
status of third party searches as wholly outside the Fourth 
Amendment, defining third party searches as an exception to 
the warrant requirement offers a sensible avenue to bring them 
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment without dramati-
cally upending law enforcement practice. 
C. WARRANTLESS THIRD PARTY SEARCHES: PROBABLE CAUSE  
OR REASONABLENESS? 
Having determined that the warrant requirement should 
not apply to third party searches, the next question is whether 
the Warrant Clause’s probable cause standard should apply. 
The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.255 
As Professor Amsterdam famously observed, the problem 
with interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is that “[i]ts lan-
guage is no help and neither is its history.”256 The unclear rela-
tionship between the two clauses raises the question of wheth-
er, if courts are to bring third party searches under the Fourth 
Amendment without a warrant requirement, they should im-
pose a probable cause requirement. There are two competing 
views on this question, among both jurists and academics, but 
the more appropriate path for third party searches is to adopt 
the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment’s first 
clause, rather than the probable cause standard of its second 
clause. 
One view, espoused prominently by Professor Amar, is that 
the two clauses are disjunctive: searches are generally to be 
governed by the Reasonableness Clause, and only those partic-
 
 252. 462 U.S. at 704. 
 253. 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (describing the Court’s precedents allowing 
vehicle searches in the course of arresting suspects). 
 254. 482 U.S. 691, 693 (1987) (referring to “the exception to the warrant 
requirement for administrative inspections of pervasively regulated indus-
tries”). 
 255. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 256. Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 395. 
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ular circumstances in which warrants are required are to be 
governed by the probable cause and specificity requirements of 
the Warrant Clause.257 As Professor Tracey Maclin has noted, 
this view had early adherents among the Court prior to the 
Warren Court’s procedural revolution.258 In 1950, the Court 
stated: “It is unreasonable searches that are prohibited by the 
Fourth Amendment. It was recognized by the framers of the 
Constitution that there were reasonable searches for which no 
warrant was required.”259 
This view appeared to fall out of favor over the following 
decades in favor of the conjunctive reading of the two clauses: 
that the Reasonableness Clause, in most cases, incorporates 
the warrant and probable cause requirements of the second 
clause.260 In Katz, the Court stated that “searches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.”261 According to Maclin, this view contin-
ued to prevail through the 1970s, with some dissenting voices 
urging a return to the disjunctive model.262 
But by the 1990s, the worm had begun to turn.263 In 1989, 
the Court stated a notably watered-down version of the con-
junctive view with regard to warrantless searches:  
Our cases indicate that even a search that may be performed without 
a warrant must be based, as a general matter, on probable cause to 
believe that the person to be searched has violated the law. When the 
balance of interests precludes insistence on a showing of probable 
cause, we have usually required “some quantum of individualized 
suspicion” before concluding that a search is reasonable.264 
Over the past few years, the Court has more openly em-
braced the view that the Warrant Clause’s requirements are 
confined to certain situations, with the Reasonableness Clause 
 
 257. See AKHIL AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3–17 
(1997); see also TAYLOR, supra note 165, at 23–50. 
 258. See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 202–04 (1993). 
 259. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950) (citation omitted). 
 260. Amsterdam, among others, has argued that, under the Fourth 
Amendment, warrants are the touchstone of reasonableness, with only limited 
exceptions. See Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 395–99. 
 261. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). 
 262. See Maclin, supra note 258, at 204–05. 
 263. See id. at 205. 
 264. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (citations 
omitted) (upholding warrantless, suspicionless drug tests of railway employ-
ees). 
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governing by default. As Professor Erin Murphy describes, 
“whereas ‘reasonableness’ cases used to fashion themselves as 
deviations from the rule, paying homage to warrants and sus-
picion, such opinions increasingly have moved away from these 
qualifiers to more expressly embrace pure ‘reasonableness.’”265 
In the October 2012 Term the preference for reasonableness 
over a presumptive warrant requirement gained explicit adher-
ence among a minority of the Court.266 And in upholding the col-
lection of DNA from certain arrestees in Maryland v. King,267 a 
majority of the Court signed on to Justice Kennedy’s quick dis-
missal of the Warrant Clause. He explained: “To say that no 
warrant is required is merely to acknowledge that ‘rather than 
employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, we balance the 
privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to de-
termine if the intrusion was reasonable.’”268 
Viewed in this light, the warrant exceptions that adhere to 
probable cause look increasingly like isolated exceptions. The 
arrest exceptions may retain probable cause requirements due 
to the fact that “[a]n arrest is a wholly different kind of intru-
sion upon individual freedom from a limited search,”269 while 
the vehicle exception’s probable cause requirement may stem 
as much from historical pedigree (having been established in 
1925270) as from a commitment to a probable cause presump-
tion. More recent exceptions, such as that for Terry stops and 
special needs searches, have looked to reasonableness as the 
“touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,”271 whether that rea-
sonableness is through individualized suspicion or program-
matic balancing of needs. Accordingly, if the courts are to craft 
a new exception to the warrant requirement, they should do so 
 
 265. Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and 
the Divided Court, 127 HARV. L. REV. 161, 184 (2013) (citing, inter alia, Ken-
tucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011)); see also id. at 185 (“Although the text 
of the Fourth Amendment does not specify when a search warrant must be ob-
tained, this Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be secured. . . . 
But we have also recognized that this presumption may be overcome in some 
circumstances because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness.” (citations omitted)). 
 266. See id. at 185–86 (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1569 
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also Bai-
ley v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1048 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 267. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
 268. Id. at 1970 (quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001)). 
 269. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968). 
 270. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (tracing the automo-
bile exception back to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)). 
 271. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970. 
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through the lens of the Reasonableness Clause. The next Part 
discusses how that application might work.  
IV.  CRAFTING A REASONABLENESS INQUIRY   
The question is whether the reasonableness standard can 
help courts make headway in the third party context. To our 
mind, the inherited third party doctrine has two key disabili-
ties. First, it tends to deploy the Fourth Amendment in an 
on/off manner, yielding a test that has difficulty accepting both 
that the Fourth Amendment should apply and that the conduct 
at issue is reasonable in light of the nature of the intrusion and 
the information sought. Second, courts and commentators con-
templating alternatives to the third party doctrine too readily 
assume that if the Fourth Amendment does apply, it must be 
through the Warrant Clause and not the Reasonableness 
Clause. Thus far we have tried to soften each of these assump-
tions in favor a reasonableness-based inquiry that does not 
simply toss the Fourth Amendment out the door when infor-
mation is stored on a cloud server or when an individual trans-
acts with her bank.  
We want to establish that third party searches should fall 
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment, while at the same 
time arguing that their legality need not be tethered to the 
warrant or probable clause requirements. Rather we want to 
redirect the constitutional inquiry to how courts should evalu-
ate reasonableness. One option would be follow Amar and apply 
a kitchen-sink reasonableness inquiry in every case.272 Another 
would enlist “special needs” cases in requiring a controlled bal-
ancing of government and private interests for different types 
of third party search programs.273 A third option, meanwhile, 
would dispose with the weighing of interests in every case, 
while retaining the flexibility to be applied to individual cases.  
We take as our signpost the recognition in Terry v. Ohio274 
that there is more than one way of evaluating reasonableness. 
The famous “Terry stop” that grew out of the Court’s balancing 
was not a subjective assessment of the expectation of the de-
tainee and the police officer in any particular case. Rather, it 
was an objective assessment of the types of circumstances in 
which persons are likely to have a diminished expectation of 
privacy and in which the ambit of police conduct is correspond-
 
 272. See Amar, supra note 138, at 801. 
 273. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring). 
 274. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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ingly broader. The Terry Court balanced the interests not on 
the specific facts, but for frisks in general, thereby allowing the 
Court to distill a single test that law enforcement and lower 
courts could implement moving forward: reasonable suspicion. 
We are not the first to realize Terry’s special place amongst 
Fourth Amendment precedents and its potential for refor-
mation of the third party doctrine. Both Slobogin and Epstein 
have pointed to Terry before. Slobogin sees Terry as an invita-
tion to set many standards varied by the level of intrusion.275 
For example, a home search would require “clear and convinc-
ing” evidence, which he estimates as having a “quantitatively 
defined” equivalent of 75% certainty; prolonged stops would re-
quire probable cause, or 50% certainty; and short Terry stops or 
roadblocks would require reasonable suspicion, or 20% to 30% 
certainty.276 Slobogin uses a survey of federal judges to tie his 
percentages to jurisprudential reality, but he does not concen-
trate on the reasoning in Terry and its progeny or its slow de-
velopment in the Supreme Court.277 These components of the 
Terry opinion deserve analysis and provide further valuable 
lessons for expanding reasonable suspicion into the third party 
area.  
Epstein, on the other hand, values Terry’s reasonable sus-
picion insofar as it allows him to split the difference between 
full protection and no protection at all.278 Epstein has long ar-
gued that an examination of privacy, specifically the common-
law tort of invasion of privacy, can have a meaningful impact 
on clarifying longstanding constitutional principles.279 With re-
spect to the Fourth Amendment, Epstein explains Katz and its 
progeny through the private law privacy torts.280 He argues 
that, as a starting point, the police can at least act as any pri-
vate citizen would act under the private law.281 Thus, he ap-
proves of Terry v. Ohio in its permitting police to follow sus-
pects on the street—the right of any private person—and its 
“operat[ion] as a sensible middle ground between a rule that al-
lowed the police to stop and frisk at will and one that required 
 
 275. See Slobogin, supra note 117, at 1056–57. 
 276. Id. at 1082–83. 
 277. Id. 
 278. See Epstein, supra note 64, at 1206. 
 279. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First 
Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1003, 1007 (2000) (examining the First Amendment through common law 
privacy torts). 
 280. See Epstein, supra note 64, at 1212–14. 
 281. Id. at 1214. 
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them to demonstrate probable cause for arrest.”282 We too rec-
ognize the doctrinal advantages of Terry as enabling a reasona-
bleness inquiry. But we base our doctrinal justification primari-
ly in the constitutional law of the Fourth Amendment—and in 
particular the specific reasoning of Terry itself—rather than 
the common law of privacy, and attempt to more fully play out 
the implications of the Terry approach. 
A. BUILDING BLOCKS: TERRY V. OHIO 
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court faced a situation in 
which it could neither deny that a law enforcement tactic con-
stituted a search nor burden officers with the full weight of the 
Warrant Clause. Prior to Terry, brief investigative stops—often 
accompanied by a limited frisk for weapons—were a standard 
practice for law enforcement. Yet it was not until the exclu-
sionary rule was imposed upon the states283 that courts began 
to confront the informal police procedure.284 In 1967, a case fi-
nally reached the Court. 
Detective Martin McFadden of the Cleveland Police De-
partment was on patrol in plainclothes when he saw two men, 
John Terry and Richard Chilton, standing on a corner.285 Detec-
tive McFadden continued to observe the two as each of them 
walked down the street, peered into a storefront, and returned 
to confer with the other.286 After several repetitions of this pat-
tern, the two men briefly met with a third person, who then 
walked away.287 McFadden suspected that the men were casing 
the storefront for a robbery and “feared they may have [had] a 
gun.”288 When Terry and Chilton rejoined the third man, 
McFadden confronted the group, identifying himself as a police 
officer and asking for their names.289 Not receiving a response, 
McFadden “grabbed petitioner Terry, spun him around so that 
they were facing the other two, with Terry between McFadden 
 
 282. Id. at 1216. 
 283. The Court adopted the exclusionary rule as a method of Fourth 
Amendment enforcement in 1914, see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 
398–99 (1914), and incorporated the Fourth Amendment against the states in 
1949, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949), but did not incorporate 
the exclusionary rule itself against the states until 1961, see Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 655–60 (1961). 
 284. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 4 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.1(a) (5th ed. 2012). 
 285. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968). 
 286. Id. at 5–6. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 289. Id. at 6–7. 
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and the others, and patted down the outside of his clothing,” 
finding a revolver in one pocket.290 At trial, the court denied 
Terry’s motion to suppress the gun and convicted him of carry-
ing a concealed weapon.291 An appellate court upheld the con-
viction on the basis that the stop and frisk at issue in Terry did 
not constitute a “full-blown search,” and thus fell outside the 
perimeter of the Fourth Amendment.292 The Supreme Court of 
Ohio dismissed the appeal, finding that “no substantial consti-
tutional question was involved.”293 
Considering Terry’s motion to suppress the gun, Chief Jus-
tice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. He began by re-
jecting the logic of the Ohio courts, stating that the Fourth 
Amendment was surely implicated in the brief stop and subse-
quent search.294 The Terry Court nonetheless refused to sup-
press the weapons, thus approving the police conduct at is-
sue.295 Although the result itself was significant, the Court’s 
reasoning was an equally momentous break with prior Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
Chief Justice Warren’s novel approach to the question fac-
ing the Court in Terry provides a blueprint for a workable ap-
proach to the third party doctrine. Of critical importance is how 
Chief Justice Warren parsed the Fourth Amendment to sepa-
rate the probable cause requirement for a warrant from what 
constitutes reasonable conduct in the search context. The Court 
accepted that the stops at issue in Terry implicated the Fourth 
Amendment. But that fact alone did not trigger the Warrant 
Clause or its attendant probable cause requirement as noted in 
Part III.296 Instead, the Court set out to determine the reasona-
bleness of McFadden’s actions. 
In crafting its reasonableness inquiry, the Court could 
have followed the path set out by prior cases. Only one year be-
fore, in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco,297 the 
Court approved an administrative search through a reasona-
 
 290. Id.  
 291. Id. at 7–8. 
 292. Id. at 8. 
 293. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 294. Id. at 19–20. 
 295. Id. at 30–31. 
 296. See id. at 18–19 (finding that the Fourth Amendment “permit[ted] a 
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer . . . re-
gardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a 
crime”). 
 297. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
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bleness inquiry.298 There the Court determined reasonableness 
by balancing the government interest against the private inter-
est. The Court lamented that “[u]nfortunately, there can be no 
ready test for determining reasonableness” other than by case-
by-case fact intensive balancing of “the need to search against 
the invasion which the search entails.”299 But while judges were 
capable of weighing systematic programs through Camara-like 
balancing, the Terry Court recognized a need for a test that law 
enforcement officers in one-off encounters could apply in the 
field.300  
Accordingly, the Court adopted a new type of reasonable-
ness inquiry. Instead of requiring lower courts to weigh inde-
pendently the interests of officer and citizen in each case, the 
Court sought to create a single test, equally administrable by 
courts and law enforcement alike. Rather than looking at the 
specific facts of the case, the Terry Court performed a one-time 
high-level balancing of frisks “as a general proposition.”301 Ul-
timately, the government’s interest prevailed, so long as the 
frisk was limited in scope.302  
Next, the Court used the balancing it had just completed to 
create a new test: “whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety 
or that of others was in danger . . . [giving] due weight . . . to 
the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw 
from the facts in light of his experience.”303 This is the remain-
ing piece of the puzzle. So long as reasonableness was locked in 
an individual-specific inquiry into subjective expectations, no 
generalizable doctrine could emerge. In Terry, therefore, the 
Court declined to require the weighing of government and pri-
vate interests in every case; the Court instead called for an ob-
jective evaluation of the specific situation at hand, but under 
the single, newly crafted standard.304 Such an approach relieved 
police from the burdens of examining the extent of government 
interest in a given pat down, allowing officers like McFadden to 
rely on the good judgment that led to his suspicion. 
 
 298. Id. at 536–37 (describing the process of “balancing the need to search 
against the invasion which the search entails”). 
 299. Id. 
 300. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
 301. Id. at 19–20. 
 302. Id. at 26.  
 303. Id. at 27 (citation omitted). 
 304. Id.  
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Although the Terry majority never uttered the words, “rea-
sonable suspicion” has become Terry’s legacy.305 The Court for a 
time resisted the “reasonable suspicion” standard, urging lower 
courts to eschew specific articulations that “fall short of provid-
ing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual situations 
that arise.”306 More recently, however, the Court has succumbed 
to the necessity of a uniform standard, characterizing Terry as 
allowing police officers “to act instantly on reasonable suspicion 
that the persons temporarily detained are armed and danger-
ous.”307 As noted above,308 the doctrine has been extended to 
temporary detentions of suitcases309 and even cars.310 Irrespec-
tive of whether a uniform phrase or a more cumbersome articu-
lation of the Terry standard is used, the Court’s reasoning is 
useful in crafting a new third party doctrine. 
B. THIRD PARTY BALANCING ACT 
The Terry Court’s move from case-by-case balancing to a 
uniform standard can be used to create an equally administra-
ble standard for third party materials. As discussed in Part III, 
though the Fourth Amendment is implicated in police acquisi-
tion of third party information, the diminished expectation of 
privacy attending to such information counsels against requir-
ing either a warrant or probable cause.311 Only a determination 
of reasonableness remains. Attempts to look at reasonableness 
by distinguishing either by types of third party information or 
total quantity of information, evaluated in Part II, suffer from 
significant shortcomings. 
Instead, courts should take a step back and conduct a one-
time balancing of the reasonableness of government access to 
third party material “as a general proposition,” in the hopes of 
distilling a uniform standard that can be applied across con-
texts. In Terry, the significant governmental interest in police 
safety and unfettered police investigation outweighed the in-
trusion into a protected space.312 The Court pointed to a trial 
 
 305. The “reasonable suspicion” language that has become synonymous 
with Terry can be found in Justice Douglas’s dissent. Id. at 37 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (“The term ‘probable cause’ rings a bell of certainty that is not 
sounded by phrases such as ‘reasonable suspicion.’”). 
 306. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 
 307. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009). 
 308. See supra Part III. 
 309. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983). 
 310. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990). 
 311. See supra Part III. 
 312. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“[T]here must be a narrowly 
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court’s finding that the suspect “presented a threat to the of-
ficer’s safety while he was investigating his suspicious behav-
ior.”313  
First, the privacy interests at stake in third party searches 
differ from those searches subject to the Fourth Amendment’s 
full warrant and probable cause requirements. While much ink 
has been spilled arguing that third party information merits 
Fourth Amendment protection,314 such a conclusion means only 
that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the in-
formation turned over to others. Measuring the extent of the 
privacy interest, however, is another matter. As has been es-
tablished, the expectation of privacy is much diminished as 
compared to the prototypical home invasion that invokes the 
full protections of the Warrant Clause.315 Indeed, currently the 
Supreme Court recognizes no such expectation.316 Thus, without 
vastly departing from current doctrine, the Court could find a 
private interest at stake comparable to the interest in being 
free from a brief pat down, due to the legitimate but lesser ex-
pectation of privacy in each case.  
Turning to the government interest at stake, the absence of 
the officer safety rationale obviously distinguishes third party 
searches from Terry. Whereas the interactions contemplated by 
Terry offer the potential for violent confrontation between offic-
ers and suspects, third party searches are defined by a lack of 
contact between officers and suspects (this lack of contact, in 
fact, is part of what makes such searches valuable).317 Yet the 
logic of Terry does not rise or fall with officer safety; in Place, 
the Court extended Terry to brief detentions of luggage at air-
ports.318 The Court found “a generalized interest in law en-
forcement” sufficient to “justify an intrusion on an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment interests in the absence of probable 
 
drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons . . . regardless of 
whether [the police officer] has probable cause to arrest the individual for a 
crime.”). 
 313. Id. at 28. 
 314. Andrew J. DeFilippis, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right 
to Privity in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1108 
(2006) (advocating that the Court overrule the third party doctrine); see also 
supra Part I.B. 
 315. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 316. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (citing Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979)); see also supra Part I. 
 317. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 562–63 (explaining that third party infor-
mation is valuable to investigators “as [third parties] are more likely to coop-
erate and less likely to tip off the suspect that an investigation is afoot”).  
 318. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702–04 (1983). 
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cause.”319 As discussed in Part III, there is a substantial law en-
forcement interest in access to third party information at the 
initial stages of investigation—not merely after probable cause 
sufficient to obtain a warrant has already been established. 
Developing leads and building probable cause requires the 
gathering of clues nearly impossible without access to at least 
some third party information.  
Weighing the privacy interest with the government need, 
courts should, as in Terry, craft a uniform standard that takes 
account of the different sides of the ledger. In the next section, 
we explain what such a standard should look like, taking as its 
cue the reasonable suspicion standard created in Terry. 
C. A NEW THIRD PARTY TEST 
A reasonable suspicion test for third party searches could 
operate as a practical middle ground between requiring war-
rants and probable cause, and the Court’s current refusal to 
recognize any reasonable expectation of privacy. To articulate 
the test, we propose looking to Terry and its progeny: officers 
should be able to point to specific, articulable facts supporting a 
reasonable suspicion that the third party search will turn up in-
formation relevant to an ongoing investigation, and searches 
should be reasonable in scope. Both of these elements are pre-
sent in Terry and its kin. While, as noted above, the common 
interpretation of the case focuses on the reasonable suspicion 
prong,320 the Court has also been careful to note that a search 
that strays beyond the scope set by Terry runs afoul of the 
Fourth Amendment.321 The application of this test will be dis-
cussed in turn. 
1. Reasonable Suspicion 
The reasonable suspicion test is familiar from Terry: the of-
ficer must have “reason to believe” that the search is necessary, 
based upon “the specific reasonable inferences which he is enti-
tled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”322 In the 
context of a third party search, there would have to be a rea-
sonable belief that the search will turn up relevant infor-
mation. Courts have found such a standard administrable in 
the context of the Stored Communications Act (the SCA),323 
 
 319. Id. at 703–04. 
 320. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009). 
 321. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993). 
 322. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
 323. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) (“Requirements for Court Order.—A court 
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which adopts the Terry standard.324 In United States v. Perrine, 
for example, the Tenth Circuit evaluated whether a request for 
the defendant’s IP address and name was based on “specific 
and articulable facts” that supported “a reasonable suspicion 
that [the defendant] was involved in child pornography.”325 
Pointing to the police officer’s affidavit, in which he described 
conversing with a witness and viewing the witness’s chat logs, 
the court found that the search was reasonable under the SCA 
standard.326 
2. Reasonable Scope 
The second inquiry for the courts would be whether a third 
party search is reasonable in scope. In Terry, the Court made 
clear that protective frisks “must be limited to that which is 
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to 
harm the officer or others nearby.”327 Application of this stand-
ard to third party searches poses some difficulty; while the 
purpose of a Terry frisk is officer protection, the purpose of a 
third party search is acquisition of information. Terry’s lan-
guage, however, provides guidance. Third party searches can be 
limited to “that which is necessary” to the investigation.328 
Therefore, an indiscriminate dredging of third party infor-
mation unrelated to the object of the investigation, or clearly 
exceeding the bounds necessary to acquire the sought-after in-
formation, would go beyond the permissible scope of the search. 
In the third party context, courts would have to examine 
the nexus between the method used and the information 
sought. Take, for example, Smith, where the Court focused en-
tirely on the question of whether the pen register installed on 
the suspect’s phone constituted a search. The Court could in-
stead have examined the specific and articulable facts that led 
the police to believe that this limited quantity of information—
 
order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that 
is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental 
entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or 
the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongo-
ing criminal investigation.”). 
 324. See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 
2008) (“[T]he ‘specific and articulable facts’ standard derives from the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Terry. Thus, we are familiar with the standard im-
posed.”). 
 325. Id. at 1203. 
 326. Id. at 1204–05. 
 327. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26. 
 328. Id. 
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a mere single day of pen register data329—would provide infor-
mation relevant to the investigation. Such evidence was legion: 
the victim of a robbery had provided police with a description of 
a pattern of harassing phone calls associated with a man in a 
vehicle driving by her house, and on this basis the police ob-
served the vehicle’s license plate, traced it to the defendant’s 
address, and requested the pen register.330 Yet in other circum-
stances, an equally limited search via pen register could fail 
this test, if the police had no specific and articulable basis for 
thinking that the pen register would produce relevant infor-
mation. 
D. EVALUATING THE TEST 
The proposed test has four major advantages over its ri-
vals: first, it provides standing for defendants to challenge 
searches, and in doing so enables judicial oversight over police 
surveillance and investigation tactics; second, it does not overly 
disrupt current police practice; third, it is easily administrable; 
and fourth, it preserves the advantages of the current third 
party doctrine.  
1. Judicial Oversight Through Standing 
Having tied our proposed test to the reasonable suspicion 
standard, we acknowledge its susceptibility to the myriad criti-
cisms levied against Terry. Numerous voices in the academy 
rail against Terry’s test, which they criticize as a paltry re-
straint on police misbehavior, as well as its metastasis from 
narrow exception to presumptive default.331 Yet even partially 
 
 329. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
 330. Id. 
 331. Attempting to catalogue the criticisms of the Terry doctrine would be 
unwise, but even a small collection demonstrates scholars’ general dissatisfac-
tion. See, e.g., Thomas Gerry Bufkin, Terry and Miranda: The Conflict Be-
tween the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 18 
MISS. C. L. REV. 199, 204 (1997) (“[T]he lower federal courts have proceeded on 
their path to expanding the permissible scope of police action in a Terry 
stop.”); Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional Doc-
trines Collide, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 747 (1994) (arguing that courts have 
not remained true to Terry’s premises); Daniel C. Isaacs, Miranda’s Applica-
tion to the Expanding Terry Stop, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 383, 387 (2009) (“The per-
missible degree of intrusion during a ‘stop and frisk’ has significantly expand-
ed since 1968.”); Rachel Karen Laser, Unreasonable Suspicion: Relying on 
Refusals To Support Terry Stops, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1995) 
(“[C]ourts have interpreted the ‘totality of the circumstances’ broadly, thus ex-
panding the scope of what constitutes an acceptable Terry stop.”); Michael J. 
Roth, Berkemer Revisited: Uncovering the Middle Ground Between Miranda 
and the New Terry, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2779, 2779 (2009) (“[A]ppellate courts 
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accepting this critique, the reasonable suspicion test for third 
party information provides valuable protection, striking the 
proper balance between privacy and law enforcement interests. 
We believe this to be true for two reasons, one doctrinal and the 
other practical.  
First, the reasonable suspicion test provides persons the 
right to challenge the collection of their personal information 
held by third parties. Under current Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence, individuals who provide their information to third 
parties cannot dispute the collection of their information based 
on a lack of standing under the Fourth Amendment.332 Fourth 
Amendment standing requires that a person challenging the 
introduction of evidence show a recognized expectation of pri-
vacy in the evidence seized before suppression will be enter-
tained.333 Thus, the third party doctrine all but prevents liti-
gants from challenging third party seizures because the Court 
refuses to recognize any expectation of privacy on the part of 
the defendant. Instead, standing attaches to the possessor of 
the information at the time of the government’s search.334 The 
reasonable suspicion test would correct this deficiency by rec-
ognizing an expectation of privacy, even if diminished, suffi-
cient to bestow standing to challenge the introduction of evi-
dence.  
Consider the effect of the reasonable suspicion test on an 
early third party case. In United States v. Payner,335 the Court 
refused to suppress bank records obtained from a bank execu-
 
have significantly expanded the scope of police authority to stop and frisk po-
tential suspects without probable cause . . . .”). At times, the judiciary has ech-
oed the scholarly frustration. See United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 
(10th Cir. 1993) (“The last decade . . . has witnessed a multifaceted expansion 
of Terry.”); United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1198 (7th Cir. 
1990) (“[The doctrine has] expanded beyond [its] original contours, in order to 
permit reasonable police action when probable cause is arguably lacking.”). 
 332. See generally Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: 
Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 907, 909–12 (1997) (describing Fourth Amendment standing). 
While courts no longer evaluate standing as an explicit factor in their 
analyses, standing has become part of the examination of reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. See DeFilippis, supra note 314, at 1102 & n.62. 
 333. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978) (“A person who is ag-
grieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of dam-
aging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or property 
has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.”). 
 334. See DeFilippis, supra note 314, at 1102 (“The third-party doctrine has 
effectively denied standing to defendants who allege illegal government sei-
zure of personal data held [by others].”). 
 335. 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
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tive. Though the case seemed to fall squarely under Miller, 
which also involved bank records,336 the method through which 
police obtained the records raised questions. The government 
agents illegally entered into the apartment of a bank’s vice 
president, stole his briefcase, and copied the contents of docu-
ments containing the financial information of one of the bank’s 
clients.337 When the government attempted to introduce the ev-
idence in prosecuting the bank’s client, the trial court sup-
pressed the evidence, with the court of appeals affirming.338 The 
Supreme Court, however, reversed; although the Court recog-
nized that “no court should condone the unconstitutional and 
possibly criminal behavior of those who planned and executed 
this ‘briefcase caper,’” the Court refused to suppress the admis-
sion of the evidence against the defendant on the grounds that 
it was only the vice president’s privacy interest that had been 
intruded upon.339 Under the reasonable suspicion test, by con-
trast, recognition of Payner’s privacy interest in the docu-
ments—even if diminished—would eliminate the bar to consid-
eration of the illegality of the search. As the Court recognized 
in Rakas v. Illinois,340 a defendant in Payner’s situation could 
“contest the lawfulness of the seizure of evidence or the search 
if [his] own property were seized during the search.”341 And of 
course, a defendant’s ability to challenge a search allows a 
court the ability to weigh in on the investigatory techniques at 
issue, rather than being forced to impotently condone the con-
duct based on the party at the defense table. 
2. Administrability 
The proposed reasonable suspicion standard should be ad-
ministrable both by law enforcement agencies and the courts. 
The standard and procedure associated with the test is familiar 
to the police, the defense bar, and the courts alike. Defense at-
torneys are experienced in probing claims of reasonable suspi-
cion and judges practiced at adjudicating disputes under the 
standard.  
 
 336. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437–38 (1976). 
 337. Payner, 447 U.S. at 729–30. 
 338. Id. at 730–31. 
 339. Id. at 733–35 (“[T]he supervisory power does not authorize a federal 
court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was 
seized unlawfully from a third party not before the court.”). 
 340. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
 341. Id. at 142 n.11. 
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Most importantly, the standard is easily applied by law en-
forcement. Discussing the warrantless searches of vehicles in-
cident to arrest, the Court stated that 
Fourth Amendment doctrine . . . is primarily intended to regulate the 
police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed in 
terms that are readily applicable by the police. . . . A highly sophisti-
cated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts . . . may 
be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and 
judges eagerly feed, but they may be literally impossible of applica-
tion by the officer in the field.342 
In another context, the Court has noted that “law enforce-
ment officers need to know, with certainty and beforehand, 
when renewed interrogation is lawful.”343 Certainly the existing 
standard—all third party searches are constitutionally unregu-
lated—provides that certainty. 
But assuming the need for some regulation, a standard 
based upon reasonableness should not fall prey to the seduction 
of sophistication. Unlike mosaic theory, which requires law en-
forcement officers to constantly survey the entirety quantity of 
gathered information from an abstract perch, the reasonable 
suspicion test requires evaluation of only one piece of infor-
mation at a time. Furthermore, it is evaluated objectively from 
the perspective of a reasonable officer, rather than from the 
perspective of the target or society at large. 
Viewed from the perspective of courts, meanwhile, the Ter-
ry standard—through its incorporation into the Stored Com-
munication Act—has already proven an applicable standard for 
courts. In United States v. Perrine,344 the Tenth Circuit noted its 
familiarity with the Terry standard and applied the “specific 
and articulable facts” requirement to the affidavit the United 
States had submitted in support of its request for electronic 
subscriber information.345 The Tenth Circuit went on to note 
that the greater protections of the Fourth Amendment did not 
apply to such information,346 but it is apparent that were the 
constitutional framework raised to the standard required under 
the statutory framework, it would not overly tax courts. 
Similarly, state supreme courts have applied the Terry 
framework under their state constitutions to at least some cat-
 
 342. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting LaFave, supra note 152, at 141–42), abrogated by Ar-
izona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 348 (2009). 
 343. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010). 
 344. 518 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 345. Id. at 1202–04. 
 346. Id. at 1204–05. 
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egories of searches that currently go unprotected under the 
Fourth Amendment. In Litchfield v. State,347 the Indiana Su-
preme Court rejected the rule of California v. Greenwood348 and 
imposed upon the police, before searching garbage, “a require-
ment of articulable individualized suspicion, essentially the 
same as is required for a ‘Terry stop’ of an automobile.”349 The 
Alaska Supreme Court followed suit, applying to searches of 
garbage “[t]he reasonable suspicion standard . . . most often 
applied in the context of investigatory stop-and-frisks.”350 Pro-
fessor Stephen E. Henderson has endorsed the departure of 
states from the Supreme Court’s third party doctrine; though 
he expresses concern over the difficulty of application of com-
plex, multilayered standards, he has noted the comparative 
simplicity of a single standard of suspicion laid out beforehand:  
One saving grace may be that such decisions can be made without re-
quiring discretion and hard work on the part of police officers in the 
field. Once a court requires a given quantum of suspicion and/or a 
given procedure to obtain a certain type of information, officers (and 
attorneys) will have clear guidance.351  
We agree, and are optimistic that the reasonable suspicion 
standard, built for administrability by police in the Terry stop 
context, can be transferred to the collection of third party in-
formation without unduly taxing officers of the court or the 
law.  
3. Maintaining Doctrinal Advantages 
Kerr identifies two vital attributes of the Fourth Amend-
ment as currently constituted that would be eviscerated under 
the many critics’ alternative schemes: technological neutrality 
and ex ante clarity.352 The third party doctrine ensures that the 
Fourth Amendment remains technologically neutral by extend-
ing preexisting protections to communicative or storage func-
tions without regard to the form used.353 By focusing on the 
technology used, Kerr argues, proposed alternatives might al-
low criminals to purposefully refrain from using third party 
services lacking protection and instead choose to funnel com-
 
 347. 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005). 
 348. 486 U.S. 35, 39–45 (1988) (finding no reasonable expectation of priva-
cy in garbage placed on the street). 
 349. Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 364. 
 350. Beltz v. State, 221 P.3d 328, 336 (Alaska 2009). 
 351. Henderson, supra note 69, at 423. 
 352. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 579–81 (technological neutrality); id. at 
581–83 (ex ante clarity). 
 353. See id. at 579–81. 
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munication through channels receiving Fourth Amendment 
protection.354 Whereas the third party doctrine does not differ-
entiate between toll records and social media posts, another re-
gime recognizing special protection for social media would fun-
nel insidious communications through Facebook. He argues 
that proposals lacking such neutrality allow criminals to shield 
their malfeasance through a “substitution effect.”355 Instead of 
passing messages through unprotected mediums, criminals will 
opt to communicate only on technologies that the Fourth 
Amendment protects.356 
Kerr also notes that the current third party doctrine pro-
vides the Fourth Amendment with ex ante clarity. The doctrine 
ensures that, upon reaching its destination, information sheds 
any prior status for whatever protections it receives in its cur-
rent location.357 Providing protection based on where the infor-
mation originated would only cause confusion for law enforce-
ment.358 The alternative, asking officers to know from where the 
data they request originated, would tremendously complicate 
police procedures for subpoena and seizure, leading to signifi-
cantly more suppressions at trial.359  
The reasonable suspicion test would maintain both techno-
logical neutrality and ex ante clarity. Applying a uniform 
standard for all third party information ensures technological 
neutrality.360 Whether police wish to use written bank records 
or e-mail metadata, they must use the same faculties of reason 
buttressed by specific, articulable facts, and the courts will en-
gage in the same reasonable suspicion analysis. In fact, the 
reasonable suspicion approach might be more technologically 
neutral than current doctrine. Kerr has acknowledged, in re-
sponse to Epstein’s similar suggestion to create an intermedi-
ate zone of reasonable suspicion, that a more flexible approach 
would ease the cliff effect between full-blown warrant-and-
 
 354. Id. at 580 (“Those who have the most to hide have the most incentive 
to take advantage of how third-party services can hide their activity.”). 
 355. Id. at 574–76; see also Reid, supra note 244, at 615–17. 
 356. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 574–76. 
 357. Id. at 582 (“[The doctrine] guarantees that once information is present 
in a location it is treated just like everything else located there.”). 
 358. Id. (“Because the history of information is erased when it arrives, the 
law can impose rules as to what the police can or cannot do based on the 
known location of the search instead of the unknown history of the infor-
mation obtained.”). 
 359. Id. at 581–82. 
 360. See id. at 579–81 (describing the Katz test as technologically neutral 
because it could be applied uniformly). 
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probable-cause protection and no protection at all; accordingly, 
it would reduce the incentive to substitute forms of communica-
tion.361 
Similarly, the reasonable suspicion standard provides ex 
ante clarity, with a single standard of reasonable suspicion ap-
plicable across types of information. Admittedly, the current 
doctrine’s blanket lack of protection is even clearer, but Kerr’s 
concerns regarding the burden on police to determine where in-
formation originated is unfounded under the reasonable suspi-
cion test. If, as Kerr contends, clarity is intended to ensure the 
police understand the rules,362 a test relying on the perspective 
of a reasonable officer fulfills that requirement.  
By contrast, most substitutes for the third party doctrine 
cannot satisfy Kerr’s criteria. The mosaic theory, for example, 
would drastically reduce clarity for law enforcement officers 
who will be faced with the difficult question of how much data 
is too much.363 Justice Alito recognized the difficulty of deter-
mining exactly how much GPS data would constitute an unrea-
sonable search;364 imagine an officer trying to determine how 
many Facebook posts, cellphone location requests, and phone 
numbers dialed she could examine before running afoul of the 
Fourth Amendment. Similarly, a pure reasonableness balanc-
ing approach would destroy any semblance of clarity for offic-
ers. Amar’s reliance on the wisdom of the community, ex-
pressed through jury verdicts, to dictate reasonableness would 
prove impossible to predict.365 Meanwhile categorization, 
though clear ex ante, would violate the precept of technological 
neutrality either through protecting certain technologies over 
others—as social media proponents suggest366—or by broadly 
blanketing practically all digital third party information with 
protection—as Solove’s system of records would.367  
 
 361. See Kerr, supra note 74. 
 362. Id. at 1236 (“The police need certain answers about what rules they 
must follow.”). 
 363. Kerr, supra note 101, at 341 (“[O]fficers may understandably cross the 
line without personal culpability.”). 
 364. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
 365. See supra Part II.C (arguing that pure balancing is unworkable for 
officers in the field). 
 366. See supra Part II.B (describing arguments in favor of exempting social 
media information from the third party doctrine). 
 367. See supra Part II.B (criticizing Professor Solove’s critique as over-
broad). 
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V.  LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS   
As noted above, an important advantage of the reasonable 
suspicion test is that it eases the cliff effect between the full 
protections of the Warrant Clause and the absence of Fourth 
Amendment protections altogether. Subjecting third party 
searches to the Reasonableness Clause, however, does create 
its own new line-drawing problem: When does an investigatory 
tactic become a third party search, subjecting it to the reasona-
ble suspicion test? Further, the reasonable suspicion test does 
not resolve some of the difficult questions currently confronting 
courts about the boundary between the third party doctrine 
and a “full blown search” requiring warrant and probable 
cause. And finally, the reasonable suspicion framework only 
applies to third party searches based on individualized suspi-
cion. While this Article’s test does not incorporate the data min-
ing programs currently before the courts, it provides a path for 
courts and future scholars to follow in addressing them. 
A. THIRD PARTY SEARCHES AND NONSEARCHES 
Defining the limit between third party searches and 
nonsearches would be a novel task for courts, one that had pre-
viously been unnecessary due to Smith and Miller. Courts 
would confront such questions as: whether the use of secret 
agents and informants—identified by Kerr as a key progenitor 
of the third party doctrine’s concentration on business rec-
ords368—constitutes a third party search; whether government 
agents must probe the source of anonymous tips to determine 
whether they compromise third party information;369 and when 
information is exposed to the public at large as opposed to be-
ing entrusted to specific third parties.370 Yet such questions 
should not prove overly vexing to either officers or courts. Of-
ficers do not need to prove the extent of the privacy interest on 
the other side of the ledger before acting in these circumstanc-
es. They simply need to be able to point to specific, articulable 
facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that evidence is to be 
found within a search of reasonable scope. It is true that such a 
limitation would engender more self-reflection than complete 
 
 368. Kerr, supra note 2, at 567–69. 
 369. Kerr offers the example of police receiving an anonymous tip alleging 
a politician’s corruption, and posits five potential sources that could implicate 
the third party doctrine to varying degrees. See id. at 584–85. 
 370. Cf., e.g., Strandburg, supra note 105, at 671–75 (offering the examples 
of Facebook messages, Facebook profile information, and posts in a public 
chatroom). 
1046 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:987 
 
freedom from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, but the resulting 
behavior should emulate best practices of investigation—
focused inquiry rather than blind casting about—or prove a 
welcome correction. 
For courts, meanwhile, hard cases at the boundary could 
often be dispatched by looking first to the behavior of the police: 
if the police acted upon reasonable suspicion and confined to a 
reasonable scope, there would be no need to ask whether the 
information acquired fell within the third party doctrine or out-
side the Fourth Amendment altogether. It is only where the po-
lice had no reasonable suspicion or the scope of their search 
was unreasonable that it would be necessary to ask whether a 
search had taken place. 
B. THIRD PARTY SEARCHES AND FULL BLOWN SEARCHES 
The reasonable suspicion test tells courts how they are to 
evaluate third party searches, rather than what constitutes a 
third party search. In other words, the difficult line already 
confronted by courts between third party searches and “full 
blown searches” would still need to be drawn. For example, the 
traditional content/noncontent distinction has held that the 
outside of a package or envelope is publicly viewable and con-
tains no content carrying significant privacy interests, while its 
inner contents are protected; courts have begun to encounter 
the question of how this distinction translates to digital infor-
mation such as e-mails and detailed browsing history.371 Other 
questions that may arise including whether use of a computer-
ized automated remote backup system—such as Dropbox—
constitutes entrusting one’s information to a third party in the 
absence of any expectation that the remote server will actually 
access that information.372 While our test cannot solve these 
problems, by creating an alternative between no protection and 
probable cause it reduces the “incredible pressure on the courts 
to reduce the scope of the Fourth Amendment by narrowly de-
fining ‘search’ and ‘seizure.’”373 
 
 371. See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510–11 & n.6 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
 372. In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), the Court relied heavily 
upon an extended discussion of the uses to which phone companies put records 
of calls sent and received, and users’ expectations thereof. Id. at 742–43.  
 373. Slobogin, supra note 117, at 1067. 
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C. DATA MINING 
Perhaps the most immediate debate around the Fourth 
Amendment surrounds data mining.374 Data mining takes two 
primary forms: “target-driven data mining,” which is “a search 
of records to obtain information about an identified target”; and 
“[e]vent-driven data mining, also called pattern-based surveil-
lance,” which “does not start with an identified suspect.”375 Tar-
get-driven data mining, as the name suggests, is driven by in-
dividualized suspicion about the target, thus rendering it sus-
susceptible to the reasonable suspicion test. Pattern-based data 
mining, by contrast, does not operate on individualized suspi-
cion. For this pattern-based variety, while the reasonable sus-
picion framework does not apply, the Reasonableness Clause of 
the Fourth Amendment may provide an alternative path for-
ward. 
When the government seeks to access376 a set of third party 
records—whether in the hands of third parties or the govern-
ment itself377—about a specific individual, this Article’s frame-
work can help courts evaluate the reasonableness of that access 
 
 374. See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (per-
mitting the NSA’s mass collection of telephonic metadata), vacated, 785 F.3d 
787 (2d Cir. 2015); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30–37 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(opposite), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 375. Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth 
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 322–23 (2008). Slobogin also provides a 
third category, “match-driven data mining,” which seeks to ascertain whether 
a suspect is, for example, already in a fingerprint, facial-recognition, or DNA 
database. Id. 
 376. A further question, outside the scope of this Article, is whether the col-
lection of such data—as opposed to its analysis—implicates privacy concerns 
(and, by extension, the Fourth Amendment). Compare, e.g., Richard A. Posner, 
Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2005), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/20/AR2005122001053 
.html (“But machine collection and processing of data cannot, as such, invade 
privacy.”), and William J. Stuntz, Against Privacy and Transparency, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Apr. 17, 2006), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/against-privacy 
-and-transparency (“The best way to stop the nightmare from happening is to 
limit not what information officials can gather, but what they can do with the 
information they find.”), with Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-
Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 356 (2008) (“It is certainly true that 
disclosure and use of information can create significant privacy problems. But 
collection can create problems as well.”).  
 377. Whether mass databases of third party information, such as telephon-
ic and internet metadata, should be held by the government or by third parties 
is a live controversy as of this Article’s writing. See Jack Goldsmith, Bruce 
Schneier on NSA v. Private Meta-Data Storage, LAWFARE  
(Feb. 14, 2014, 4:18 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/02/bruce-schneier 
-on-nsa-v-private-meta-data-storage (describing an ongoing debate on who 
should warehouse NSA data). 
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as a matter of Fourth Amendment law. Take, for example, the 
facts of Smith, where the government was seeking to confirm 
the identity of a stalker and possible robber based upon de-
scriptions of phone calls received by the victim.378 If the gov-
ernment had potentially available to it all of Smith’s phone 
calls, bank records, internet domains visited, Facebook activity, 
e-mails sent and received, etc., what of this information could it 
reasonably access? This Article’s test would demand that the 
government demonstrate reasonable suspicion that a given set 
of records would produce evidence relevant to the investigation, 
and that the scope of the search not exceed that which is neces-
sary. Given the witness’s description of several days of harass-
ing phone calls, the government would be entitled to access 
Smith’s phone records over that time period. Bank records 
would be a closer question, but the government could reasona-
bly suspect that Smith might have received and deposited a 
significant amount of money following the robbery, depending 
on what was taken. However, his browser history, e-mail con-
tacts, and Facebook activity would all be too unlikely to yield 
evidence of the crimes,379 and thus would fall outside the rea-
sonable scope of the search. 
For pattern-based data mining, the reasonable suspicion 
framework would not provide a workable solution, any more 
than one could stop and frisk an entire street full of people be-
cause one suspects that one of them might have a gun. Howev-
er, courts could follow the doctrinal framework set out in Part 
III to evaluate the mass analysis of third party data through 
the lens of the Reasonableness Clause. Under this analysis, 
pattern-based data mining would constitute a suspicionless 
programmatic search akin to those that have been analyzed 
under the Court’s special needs doctrine, where courts balance 
intrusiveness against government need.380 Under such a 
framework, for example, the Second Circuit upheld 
suspicionless bag searches in the New York City subway in the 
wake of the London tube bombings.381 In the context of data 
 
 378. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
 379. It is obviously possible to imagine that such records could turn up evi-
dence of a crime, but from the facts of Smith there would be no specific, articu-
lable facts to so suggest. 
 380. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 
U.S. 67, 76–86 (2001); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–66 
(1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989); Griffin v. 
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 693 
(1987)). 
 381. See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 275 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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mining, courts would have to weigh the privacy intrusion of the 
mass analysis of third party information against the govern-
ment’s interest. This evaluation is far beyond the scope of this 
Article—and would depend heavily upon the details of a partic-
ular program—but the relocation of third party searches from 
outside the Fourth Amendment to within its Reasonableness 
Clause offers a doctrinal path forward for future analyses. 
  CONCLUSION   
Controversy surrounding the third party doctrine will not 
abide any time soon. On one side are those who believe that the 
protections of warrant and probable cause requirements long 
afforded to private information need to be extended onto the 
platforms where such information now resides. On the other 
side are those who believe that, in an era when commercial ac-
tors can assemble stunningly detailed portraits of one’s rela-
tionships, habits, and proclivities, such requirements would 
hamstring the government in the service of providing no more 
than an illusory fig leaf of privacy. The middle ground outlined 
in this Article will likely satisfy neither camp. Yet as a matter 
of Fourth Amendment law, the third party doctrine fits natu-
rally within the warrant exceptions subject to a rule of reason-
ableness. And, as a practical matter, such a move will allow 
courts to impose a uniform standard that will provide neces-
sary oversight to curb the worst abuses of privacy while afford-
ing discretion and clarity to law enforcement. 
 
